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Abstract 
In hand-collected subsidiary data on 17,331 public firms from 52 countries, we identify expropriation-related 
motives for establishing tax haven subsidiaries. We document four results: First, increased transparency of 
haven activities, resulting from the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), increases the 
value of affected firms by 2.5%. Second, the effect is stronger for firms with complex tax haven structures. 
Third, some firms respond to TIEAs by haven hopping, i.e., they move subsidiaries from affected to unaffected 
havens. Fourth, the value effect is larger among weakly governed firms. Thus, tax havens serve expropriation-
related activities that extend beyond tax saving activities. 
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1. Introduction 
A tax haven is a state or territory in which corporate and personal tax rates are so low that 
foreign companies—or individuals—have incentives to establish shell companies to shield their 
income from higher tax liabilities at home. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) estimates that between USD 5 trillion and USD 7 trillion were held 
offshore in 2007; a study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers reveals that between USD 21 trillion and 
USD 32 trillion were held offshore in 2012. The US organization Citizens for Tax Justice finds 
that three in four Fortune 500 firms are active in tax havens.  
In early 2014, the press uncovered prominent tax schemes involving companies such as Apple 
and Starbucks. In November 2014, the Luxembourg Tax Leak brought to light the private 
arrangements of almost 400 large international companies with the Luxembourg tax authority to 
pay less than 1% in tax—the official Luxembourg corporate tax rate is 29%. While these 
schemes will likely be the subject of major policy debates in the EU in the coming years, the US 
has shown a strong interest in regulating the use of offshore tax havens ever since it first signed 
Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) with tax havens some 15 years ago.1 
It is well recognized in the literature that tax havens are used to avoid taxes otherwise payable 
in countries with high tax rates.2 In order to reduce their tax bills, firms may shift revenues from 
high-tax locations to tax haven subsidiaries that have no or little operational activities. Revenues 
can be shifted, for example, through registering patents or trademarks with tax haven subsidiaries 
                                                          
1
 The public debate largely focuses on the costs of tax havens for high-tax countries yet some studies show that low-tax regimes 
have positive spillovers on nearby high-tax regimes, e.g., on foreign direct investment, subsidiary investment, and growth 
(Dharmapala 2008, Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004, 2006A, Slemrod and Wilson 2006). 
2
 E.g., Hines and Rice 1994, Graham and Tucker 2006, Dyreng and Lindsey 2009, and Dyreng et al. 2013. A literature review of 
research on motives and determinants of tax avoidance is provided by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010). Graham et al. (2014) 
provide evidence from a survey of tax executives. 
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and charging operational subsidiaries in high-tax locations a fee for use of these assets. On its 
own, such activity aimed at saving taxes has a positive effect on shareholder value. 
In this paper, we document a second, negative effect: Beyond pure tax savings, managers or 
controlling owners use tax havens for self-serving activities that are not aligned with the interest 
of minority investors. Lacking transparency by their very nature, tax haven activities may allow 
controlling shareholders or managers to derive private benefits at the cost of non-controlling 
shareholders. For instance, managers may pile cash in tax havens to finance inefficient 
acquisitions (Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi 2015). Moreover, expropriation can involve tunneling or 
outright theft, e.g., through third-party transactions as has been documented in extreme 
environments that lack transparency and enforcement, such as Russia (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 
2007 and Mironov 2013). We show that such expropriation also occurs through the use of tax 
havens, even by firms headquarted in countries with strong governance standards.  
One extreme but illustrative example of using tax havens to expropriate investors was 
uncovered in courts after the collapse of Enron in 2002. Enron CFO Andrew Fastow created a 
complex network of 881 offshore subsidiaries, of which 692 were located in the Cayman Islands, 
119 in Turks and Caicos, 43 in Mauritius, and 8 in Bermuda. Not only did this network of 
subsidiaries allow Enron to avoid paying taxes, but the court case also revealed that Fastow and 
his friends transferred considerable resources to companies that they controlled outside of Enron. 
In particular, Fastow and his friends constructed Special Purpose Entities allowing them to 
transfer at least USD 42 million to their own accounts, which contributed significantly to 
Enron’s downfall.3 In hindsight, the complex structure of these tax haven subsidiaries served a 
dual purpose, allowing Enron to save taxes and Fastow and his friends to enrich themselves at 
                                                          
3
 Special Purpose Entitites had names such as CHIWCO, LJM1, and LJM2. LJM are the initials of Fastow’s wife and children. 
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the cost of the shareholders. In sum, the Enron case illustrates how tax haven subsidiaries can be 
used against shareholders’ interests but also highlights the importance of complexity.  
Our empirical strategy focuses on identifying shareholders’ reaction to increased transparency 
of corporate tax haven activities. In order to measure corporate tax haven activities, we hand-
collect data covering 17,331 publicly listed firms from 52 countries and their circa 232,000 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries, some of which are headquartered in tax havens. We exploit 
the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) between 2001 and 2011 as a 
shock to the transparency of tax haven activities. TIEAs are bilateral agreements between two 
countries allowing for exchange of information about corporations and individuals relevant in tax 
audits. We provide further details on how TIEAs may impact corporate behavior in Section 2. 
The passage of TIEAs constitutes a natural experiment to test whether tax haven activities are 
driven by expropriation motives that extend beyond pure tax-saving motives. If managers use tax 
havens to hide, tunnel, or destroy resources, TIEAs will facilitate the detection of such activities. 
In this case, we conjecture that the passage of TIEAs will increase shareholder value. In this 
interpretation, TIEAs are a regulatory instrument that may improve the protection of minority 
investors and impact firm value.4 Of course, even though TIEAs do not directly affect corporate 
taxes, they may indirectly lead to a reassessment of a firm’s tax base. This is the case when, for 
instance, they result in detection of transfer pricing schemes that are deemed too aggressive. 
Thus, under the tax-savings motive on its own, TIEAs have a negative impact on firm value. 
TIEAs constitute an ideal experimental setting because they are bilateral: They affect some 
firms headquartered in one signatory country with operations in the other signatory country (the 
tax haven) while leaving other firms with operations in different tax havens or headquartered in 
                                                          
4
 See, for instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) and Doigde, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) on the role of 
country characteristics in determining firm characteristics and firm value. 
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different countries unaffected. More than 500 TIEAs were passed at different points in time over 
the past 15 years, affecting more than 300 publicly listed firms headquartered in different 
countries and at different points in time. Above all, counterfactuals – such as publicly traded 
companies that are headquartered in one signatory country but that do not have tax haven 
subsidiaries – are identified easily.5  
We document four main results related to the expropriation motive of tax haven activities. 
First, using annual data, we show that implementing a TIEA increases average shareholder value, 
measured by Tobin’s Q, by 2.5% on average. We re-confirm this result using daily abnormal 
stock returns around the signing of TIEAs, reducing the concern that the signing of TIEAs 
coincides with similar policy changes that may occur within the same year.6 In additional tests 
we show that the passage of TIEAs does not lead to significant increases in firm efficiency, 
measured by gross margin and profit margin, nor does the passage reduce treated firms’ beta, a 
measure of firm risk. Thus, our result does not seem to be driven by an increase in operational 
activities, a reduction in managerial slack, or a reduction in firm risk.  
Second, suggestive of expropriation, we document that the positive impact of TIEAs on 
shareholder value is stronger for firms with more complex structures of tax haven subsidiaries. 
We measure complexity by the number of subsidiaries in tax havens and the percentage of firm 
subsidiaries in tax havens. The Enron case highlights the importance of a complex structure for 
expropriation: Whereas non-controlling shareholders can obtain information about the existence 
                                                          
5
 Few papers have exploited the passage of TIEAs. Johannesen and Zucman (2014) show that after the passage of TIEAs, bank 
deposits are shifted from affected to unaffected tax havens. German foreign direct investment and the number of German 
subsidiaries in tax havens declined after Germany passed TIEAs (Braun and Weichenrieder 2014). Bilicka and Fuest (2014) 
document that TIEAs are typically passed between countries and tax havens with stronger economic links, though we do not 
confirm this result when we measure economic links by the number of foreign subsidiaries in tax havens. Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Thornock (2015) document that TIEAs help reduce round-tripping tax evasion. 
6
 A further endogeneity concern arises from the fact that TIEAs may be passed between specific countries and tax havens at 
specific times, e.g., as a function of economic links. We measure economic links by the number of subsidiaries for any country-
tax haven pair and find no evidence of TIEAs being passed with tax havens harboring particularly many or few affected 
subsidiaries. This alleviates such endogeneity concerns. 
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of a particular tax haven subsidiary, it is difficult to obtain information about that subsidiary’s 
investment in other tax haven vehicles. TIEAs, however, allow for making information about 
ownership structures, investments, and trading patterns of tax haven subsidiaries and their 
subsidiaries available. If complex subsidiary structures are used to generate private benefits for 
controlling owners, TIEAs make such actions more costly.  
Third, we find that one third of treated firms engage in haven hopping: They strategically 
move subsidiaries from tax havens that entered TIEAs to tax havens that did not. Haven hopping 
is suggestive of expropriation but hard to align with the tax savings motive, particularly because 
the positive impact of TIEAs on treated firms is not present among firms that engage in haven 
hopping. Of course, haven hopping may suggest that our estimate of the true effect of TIEAs on 
firm value is conservative, given that firms that move subsidiaries to tax havens that did not enter 
TIEAs do not become more transparent. Haven hopping also suggests that TIEAs benefit the 
least compliant tax havens though we do not investigate this side effect further in this paper. 
Fourth, we show that the positive effect of TIEAs on firm value is larger for firms with lower 
institutional ownership, a proxy for the strength of monitoring and governance by non-
controlling owners. This finding – that weakly governed firms benefit more from the 
introduction of TIEAs – is consistent with the notion that weakly governed firms might be more 
exposed to expropriation by controlling shareholders.  
Taken together, we provide novel evidence that the use of corporate tax havens is partly 
driven by private motives of controlling owners or managers. Our estimate of the magnitude of 
the effect of TIEAs on firm value is likely conservative. First, as outlined above, TIEAs may – at 
in expectation – indirectly increase firms’ tax base; this would partly offset the gains of increased 
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transparency. Second, some treated firms actively avoid TIEAs, e.g. by haven hopping; such 
firms do not benefit from the passage of TIEAs. 
In addition to our main result on expropriation, our cross-country setting with 52 countries 
allows us to provide evidence that tax havens are, indeed, also used to save taxes. For instance, 
we find that the use of tax haven subsidiaries is more prominent among firms headquartered in 
countries with high tax rates, particularly income tax rates. Exploiting reductions in corporate tax 
rates over the past 7 years, we document that a 1 percentage point reduction in firms’ home-
country corporate tax rate is associated with a 1.2% increase in the value of firms without tax 
haven subsidiaries while firms with tax haven subsidiaries are unaffected. While these result are 
not surprising, they confirm and extend existing knowledge about the link between tax savings 
and corporate tax haven activity. This supplements previous evidence by Markle and Robinson 
(2012) who document a negative correlation between firms’ tax rate in non-tax haven 
subsidiaries and the use of tax havens. In Germany, however, some foreign income is tax 
exempt, and indeed, manufacturing firms do not exhibit this negative relation (Gumpert, Hines, 
and Schnitzer 2011).  
We are also able to contribute to the literature on the characteristics of firms that use tax 
haven subsidiaries. So far, such evidence was by-and-large based on US firms: Tax havens are 
used more by large firms, international firms, firms with extensive intra-firm trade and high 
R&D intensity, and less constrainted firms (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2006B, Dyreng and Markle 
2013). Internationally, Markle and Robinson (2012) document that tax haven firms are larger 
but, surprisingly, less R&D intensive. We find a positive relation between several measures of 
innovative activity (including R&D) and the use of tax havens. This relation is robust to adding 
additional controls, including country and industry fixed effects.  
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The paper closest to ours by Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) shows that, in Russia, stronger 
tax enforcement reduces income diversion by insiders. Their model features a trade-off between 
tax enforcement’s impact on taxes paid and the cost of income diversion to insiders. 7 
Empirically, they show that the Russian oil firm Sibneft earns positive abnormal returns around 
five tax enforcement events in Russia, indicating that tax enforcement can have a positive impact 
on firm value. Mironov (2013) supports these findings: In Russia, tax enforcement correlates 
positively with operating performance. We contribute to this literature by showing that the 
relationship between aggressive tax avoidance and expropriation extends far beyond countries 
that lack investor protection and have weak corporate governance.8  
Another strand of the literature has studied the link between tax savings and leverage. Heider 
and Ljungqvist (2012) document an asymmetric relation between changes in state-level tax rates 
and leverage adjustments. Faulkender and Smith (2014) construct a new measure of firm-specific 
foreign tax rates to show that US firms with a higher such tax rates are more levered. In a 
carefully collected sample of 44 tax sheltering cases, Graham and Tucker (2006) show that firms 
engaged in tax sheltering have lower leverage than matched firms.9 Leverage, studied in this 
stream of the literature, and the use of corporate tax havens, studied in the paper at hand, can be 
regarded as substitute tax saving mechanisms.  
Many papers have examined the relation between firm-specific accounting measures of tax 
avoidance and firm value. Representatively, Desai and Dharmapala (2005) show that tax 
avoidance (measured at the firm level by the book-tax gap) has no effect on firm value on 
                                                          
7
 In the Appendix, we provide a theoretical model in the spirit of Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007). 
8
 Tax enforcement has also been linked to the cost of capital (Guedhami and Pittman 2008, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Pittman 
2011) and earnings quality (Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 2014). Similarly to tax enforcement, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board’s (PCAOB’s) Regulatory Regime has been shown to improve information quality, with positive implications for 
firm value and reporting credibility (Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett 2015, Shroff 2015). 
9
 Relatedly, a growing literature has documented that corporate inversions, particularly those into tax havens, are driven by tax 
motives (e.g. Babkin, Clover, and Levine 2015, Bailey and Liu 2014, Col, Liao, and Zeume 2016, Cortes, Gomes, and Gopalan 
2014, and Desai and Hines 2002). 
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average but a positive effect among strongly governed firms. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
summarize this literature in great detail and put it into perspective; they highlight that 
accounting-based measures of tax avoidance are not ideal for international studies because 
differences, for instance, in the book-tax gap can be due to differences in accounting rules or due 
to differences in expropriation of outside shareholders. Compared to a vast literature on 
accounting measures, we measure tax avoidance by identifying firms with tax haven subsidiaries. 
In sum, we show that tax havens are used for expropriation activities that go beyond pure tax 
saving activities. Our evidence is based on passage of bilateral TIEAs, which provide a powerful 
source of exogenous variation in the transparency of tax havens. Additional evidence on haven 
hopping as well as the role played by complexity and firm governance support our preferred 
interpretation that our result is indicative of exporopriation activities. 
2. Theory, institutional background and identification strategy 
2.1 Theoretical arguments 
To illustrate our theoretical thinking and to guide our preferred interpretation of the empirical 
results, we offer–in the Appendix–a simple model that derives the main testable implications we 
investigate in this paper. In the simplest version of our model, establishing a tax haven subsidiary 
benefits a firm by saving it taxes but at the cost of establishing the subsidiary. It follows that tax 
haven subsidiaries are used more in countries with higher tax rates and that decreases in tax rates 
benefit all firms but less so if these firms have a tax haven subsidiary.10 
We extend the model, allowing entrenched managers to divert a fraction of cash transferred to 
a tax haven. Such diversion comes at a cost that is increasing in corporate governance and 
decreasing in the complexity of tax haven subsidiary structure. We show that an improvement in 
                                                          
10
 We  provide empirical evidence supporting this simple relationship in Section 6 and Online Appendix 3 and 4. 
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external governance – such as the introduction bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEAs) between two countries–has two opposing effects on shareholder value. First, it may have 
a negative effect through reducing the amount of cash that can be transferred to a tax haven. 
Second, it may have a positive effect because it increases the cost of engaging in self serving 
activities, thereby reducing such activities.  
The dual impact of TIEAs on shareholder value delivers the key results around which we 
design our empirical analysis: If tax havens are only used for tax savings – which would be in the 
interest of all owners – then a TIEA should weakly reduce shareholder value. Hence, if TIEAs 
empirically have a positive effect on shareholder it strongly supports the notion that tax havens 
are used by entrenched owners or managers for self serving activities that goes beyond pure tax 
saving. We test this prediction in Section 5. 
Last but not least, the model allows us to examine the role of complexity of haven operations. 
For this, we allow complexity of tax haven structure to facilitate both (i) the ability to save taxes 
and (ii) the ability to exercise self-serving activities. However, the model shows that the 
interaction effects have different signs depending on which motive dominates. Again, we test 
these predictions in Section 5.  
2.2 TIEAs and their effect on corporations 
TIEAs are bilateral agreements between territories aimed at promoting the exchange of tax-
relevant information in civil and criminal tax investigations. Regarding firms, such tax-relevant 
information comprises bank details and ownership details of companies, funds, and trusts. 
Similarly, TIEAs allow for the exchange of tax information on individuals’ accounts. It is 
important to emphasize that TIEAs do not change tax laws of signatory countries. Thus, if firms’ 
10 
 
tax policy follows the rules in both signatory countries, TIEAs do not require any change in 
firms’ tax policies.11  
TIEAs have been critizised for being overly complicated to use, a feature that may explain the 
low number of succesfull information requests.12 However, TIEAs may still have an impact on 
tax haven activities for at least four reasons. First, even a small increase in the probability of 
detection constitutes an additional cost to insiders engaged in self-serving activities because 
information obtained through TIEAs can be used in civil and criminal tax investigations. Second, 
information obtained by tax authorities may be distributed to corporate boards even in cases 
where tax authorities do not find substantial evidence of tax fraud. Thus, TIEAs increase the 
likelihood of boards having more clarity about corporate structures and activities in tax havens, 
especially in cases where tax haven structures are more complex. Notice that minority owners 
may know that a firm has a subsidiary in a given tax haven yet the introduction of TIEAs 
increases the likelihood of obtaining more information about investments, ownership, and trades 
of the tax haven subsidiary. Ultimately, managers may be fired based on suspicion or even 
rumors. Third, in the future, TIEAs may be augmented to automatic information transmission, 
covering information on all subsidiaries of firms engaged in tax havens covered by the TIEA. 
Thus, TIEAs can be seen as a first step towards automatic information transmission, and 
shareholders may expect to obtain more clarity about tax haven activities in the near future. 
Fourth, practitioners do take TIEAs seriously and advise corporations to avoid countries that 
have signed TIEAs.13  
                                                          
11
 See oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm and https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/publications/tax-information-exchange-agreements-overview for more information. 
12
 Among such criticism, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2015) list that (i) information is only exchanged upon request rather 
than automatically, (ii) bank secrecy laws remain unaffected from the passage of TIEAs, and (iii) exchanged information is 
limited to information collected by signatory countries. It is important to emphasize that almost all TIEAs cover tax haven 
activities by both individuals and firms. 
13
 Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock (2015) cite Barber (2007) for the following advice: “ . . . you should not do business with a 
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Ultimately, it remains an empirical question whether TIEAs affect corporate tax haven 
activities or not. For instance, Hanlon et al. (2015) show that TIEAs affect tax shielding 
behavior. In this paper, we provide strong evidence that TIEAs can have a significant positive 
impact on shareholder value. 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
Since 2000, over 500 TIEAs have been signed. While most of these agreements were signed 
after 2008, our focus is on the number of firms directly affected by TIEAs over time. Firms are 
directly affected by a TIEA through being headquartered in one signatory country and having a 
subsidiary in the other signatory country. Figure 1 shows that the number of treated firms 
increased substantially in 2001 and 2002, as well as in the years following 2008. This time series 
variation in the number of affected firms is important for our identification strategy as it rules out 
alternative explanations such as the financial crisis that may affect tax haven firms differentially. 
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
As we are interested in implications of tax enforcement for publicly listed firms, we focus on 
TIEAs that involve one sovereign non-haven territory.14  Some countries are not among the 
signatory countries, e.g., Brazil and Russia.15 Online Appendix 1 lists TIEAs involving exactly 
one tax haven country (or non-sovereign nation) and one non-tax haven country (Source: OECD 
Harmful Tax Practices), and affecting at least one sample firm. Listed are 362 agreements 
between non-tax haven signatories (Panel A) and tax haven signatories (Panel B). Some sample 
firms may be affected by more than one TIEA: we focus on the first treatment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
TIEA tax haven . . . this device has undermined once good tax havens” (p.127). 
14
 For instance, at least one third of TIEAs are between two tax havens or between tax havens and economically small non-
sovereign territories, such as between the Faroe Islands and Greenland. 
15
 These countries would provide some interesting cross-country predictions: In Russia, for instance, tax avoidance or tax fraud 
do not require complex tax haven constructs but can be achieved through outright theft (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007; 
Mironov 2013). Thus, a TIEA signed by Russia might have no impact on Russian tax haven firms. 
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We estimate the effect of tax enforcement on firm value using a difference-in-difference 
approach that follows Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Specifically, we estimate 
yisct = αi + αst + β1TREATEDisct + X´it γ + εisct  (1) 
for firm i, time t, sector s, and headquarter country c. yisct is the dependent variable of interest 
(e.g., Tobin’s Q), TREATEDisct is a dummy that equals one if a firm has been affected by a TIEA 
signed between its headquarter country and a tax haven in which that firm has a subsidiary, and 
εisct is an error term. αi and αst are firm and year times industry fixed effects, respectively, and 
controls in vector Xit comprise size, age, and size squared. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country and year level (2-way clustering), though results are robust to alternative specifications. 
In a variation, we run (1) on treated firms and matched control firms; we additionally include 
post-treatment dummies for control firms. Because treatment is staggered over time (see Figure 
1), alternative events affecting treated firms at the same time—such as the financial crisis—are 
less likely to drive our results. However, in an unreported robustness test, we also run our main 
specification on all firms including year times country fixed effects. In a further variation of (1) 
above, yisct denotes daily returns and TREATEDisct denotes days around the signing of TIEAs.16 
Econometrically, the nature of TIEAs—they are bilateral and staggered over time— alleviates 
some common event study concerns. First, the signing of TIEAs is a bilateral action resulting 
from a political process that is generally exogenous to those firm-level variables important for 
this study. Additionally, in Online Appendix 2, we confirm that the passage of TIEAs between 
country pairs is not easily explained by economic links between non-haven countries and tax 
havens. We run probit regressions explaining the passage of TIEAs between pairs of tax haven 
territories and non-tax haven countries. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy variable equal to 
                                                          
16
 We control for day and firm fixed effects using a Stata program provided by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010). 
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one if a pair consisting of a non-haven country and a tax haven territory  has passed a TIEA by 
2013 and zero otherwise. The key right-hand-side control is the economic link between 
respective pairs, measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries held between country pairs. 
Such economic links do not significantly explain the passage of TIEAs, alleviating the concern 
that TIEAs are explained by economic links.   
Second, even if the passage of TIEAs is not explained by economic links, the passage may be 
driven by general changes in the regulatory environment in firms’ home countries, i.e., by time 
trends. For instance, the passage of TIEAs may be part of a one-off regulatory effort to increase 
tax enforcement. Our difference-in-difference methodology takes such potentially omitted 
variables into account: We compare treated firms to control firms headquartered in the same 
country before and after the passage of TIEAs, and TIEAs are passed at different points in time. 
Third, some concerns about the exogeneity of the passage of TIEAs remain when considering 
other unobservable or non-measurable determinants of the passage of TIEAs. For instance, the 
signing of a TIEA may be driven by the fact that public firms headquartered in one signatory 
country use specific tax havens for very aggressive tax avoidance. For instance, the US regulator 
may be aware that US firms use their Cayman Island subsidiaries for very aggressive tax 
avoidance and therefore decide to sign an agreement. However, we argue that such 
considerations typically work against us finding a positive effect of TIEAs on firm value: If 
investors could predict country-tax haven pairs that enter TIEAs, the effect of TIEAs would be 
priced before the signing is announced. Additionally, the illustrative consideration outlined 
above would suggest that the signing of a TIEA between the US and the Cayman Islands 
increases the cost of using the Cayman Islands to reduce corporate taxes. All else being equal, 
this cost would destroy shareholder value. 
14 
 
Fourth, one may be concerned that the positive shareholder reaction around the passage of 
TIEAs reflects that tax havens avoided something worse from happening, such as economic 
sanctions against the haven and/or firms engaged in the haven. To alleviate this concern, we 
study firm value over the five years prior to the signing of TIEAs; firm value over these five 
years is flat and the value reaction around signing dates does not constitute a reversal. Moreover, 
focusing on each haven’s first signing of a TIEA, we compare the share price reaction of firms 
exposed to TIEAs to that of firms exposed to the signatory tax haven but not headquartered in 
the other signatory country. If TIEAs signaled that a haven avoided something worse, this 
condition should affect all firms with exposure to that haven, regardless of headquarter country. 
However, we find that only firms directly affected through the bilateral nature of TIEAs have a 
positive share price reaction around the first passage of a TIEA by a haven.  
3. Data 
3.1 Subsidiary data 
We hand-collect firm-level subsidiary data from Dun and Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 
2013/2014 book series. This source lists public and private firms, the subsidiaries they hold to 
50% or more, and subsidiaries of subsidiaries. The data also include subsidiaries’ headquarter 
countries, including tax havens.17 Starting with the WorldScope universe of publicly listed, active 
firms, we match subsidiary information for 17,331 publicly listed firms from 52 countries. In 
total, these firms have 231,850 subsidiaries at home and abroad. For part of our analysis, we 
supplement the 2013/14 data with 2008/2009 and 1998/1999 data.  
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 Similarly, Capital IQ and Orbis provide subsidiary information. However, comparing data on 20 randomly selected large 
multinational firms in Dun & Bradstreet to data in Capital IQ and Orbis, we find that these sources report fewer and sometimes 
no tax haven subsidiaries in many cases. Missing subsidiaries tend to be subsidiaries headquartered in non-sovereign territories, 
but these are crucial for our analysis. Additionally, our source enjoys advantages in terms of sample period: Capital IQ does not 
provide historical subsidiary data; Orbis data dates back to 2005. Some of our analysis requires pre-2005 data. 
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Three remarks on this ownership data are in order. First, the data do not provide information 
on the relative size of subsidiaries. We therefore restrict our analysis to dummy variables 
indicating whether a firm is exposed to a certain tax haven or not. Second, the data do not 
include third party transactions, ownership stakes of less than 50%, and other types of 
engagement in tax havens. It is possible that such engagements may be a vehicle through which 
resources can be tunneled to third parties.18 For this reason, we are likely to understate the 
effective importance of entrenchment. Finally, the data do not distinguish operational 
subsidiaries from pure tax vehicles. However, as we will see in the following subsection, 
comparing the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to population (and country size) for tax havens to the 
corresponding ratios for non-tax havens provides strong support that most—if not all—tax haven 
subsidiaries are not operational. 
3.2 Tax havens  
The key element of tax havens for our purpose is that they offer income and/or corporate tax 
rates so low that individuals and/or corporations from abroad are incentivized to engage in tax 
avoidance (e.g. Dharmapala and Hines 2006). Lists of countries and territories that constitute tax 
havens are abundant.19 Table 1 summarizes four such lists and adds an additional list of low tax 
countries that entered TIEAs at some point in time.  
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
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 Chernykh and Mityakov (2014), for example, document that 9.9% of Russian banks’ foreign flows go through offshore 
accounts. Such foreign account transactions are not captured by our data. Indeed, only two of our 103 Russian sample firms have 
subsidiaries in territories considered a tax haven by some list (Luxembourg and Cyprus). 
19
 No universally agreed upon definition of a tax haven exists. A popular, short definition characterizes a tax haven as “a country 
or territory where certain taxes are levied at a low rate or not at all”. A slightly more elaborate definition is given by Geoffrey 
Powell (former economic adviser to Jersey): "What ... identifies an area as a tax haven is the existence of a composite tax 
structure established deliberately to take advantage of, and exploit, a worldwide demand for opportunities to engage in tax 
avoidance.” 
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First, countries and non-sovereign states that have not substantially implemented 
internationally agreed tax standards constitute the OECD Grey List (see List 1). While this list is 
time-varying, we use the Grey List as of August 17, 2009. By that list, 34 territories are 
described as tax havens. These territories are predominantly located in Europe and the 
Caribbean, though some are located in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Larger 
independent countries such as Hong Kong and Ireland are not classified as tax havens though 
Singapore is. Second, while never enacted, the “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act” (US Congress; 
S.1533) is widely cited as a source of tax haven territories. The Act lists 30 territories including 
Hong Kong and Singapore (see List 2). Third is the original OECD Tax Haven list, which 
includes 42 territories (see List 3). Fourth, Hines and Rice (1994) provide a more practical list 
based on true rather than official corporate tax rates (see List 4). Luxembourg, for instance, is 
part of List 4 but not included in Lists 1-3. Indeed, Luxembourg has an official corporate tax rate 
of 29%. Yet companies can enter private agreements on low taxes (1% and less) and Advanced 
Tax Agreements with the Luxembourg tax authorities. Fifth, as we use TIEAs as an experiment, 
we provide a list of all low-tax regimes that entered such agreements according to the OECD 
(see OECD Harmful Tax Practices).20 While most of our descriptive analysis is based on List 1, 
all results are robust to using other lists. Our analysis on entrenchment uses the list of havens that 
entered TIEAs. 
In order to further investigate the caveat that subsidiaries in tax havens may serve operational 
purposes rather than pure tax saving purposes, we extend Table 1 by geographic data and foreign 
subsidiary counts for tax havens and, for comparison, to the United States. We find that, relative 
                                                          
20
 The 2013/2014 version of Who Owns Whom no longer lists certain territories such as the Isle of Man and the US Virgin Islands 
as separate headquarter countries. This may lead to an understatement of the use of tax haven subsidiaries in our descriptive 
analysis. However, earlier editions of Who Owns Whom do list such territories, alleviating the concern that some of our tests on 
entrenchment understate the true effect. 
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to population and area, foreign subsidiaries are substantially more common in tax havens. In the 
United States, on average, one finds 1 foreign subsidiary per 9,946 inhabitants or per 307 square 
kilometers. Among sovereign tax havens, one finds 1 subsidiary per 5,567 inhabitants or per 19 
square kilometers. Among smaller non-sovereign tax havens, 1 subsidiary exists per 671 
inhabitants or per 2 square kilometers. In the extreme, in the British Virgin Islands and the 
Cayman Islands, a single foreign subsidiary exists per 19 and 50 inhabitants, respectively, or per 
less than 0.1 square kilometers. 
3.3 Country characteristics 
Part of our analysis is a description of the use of tax havens by country characteristics. We 
measure economic development, entrenchment, and taxes faced at home.  
Economic development is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in USD in 2013 (data 
obtained from the World Bank). Entrenchment is hard to measure, yet the quality of the 
institutional environment provides an indirect proxy. First, we use ICRG (Property Rights 
Protection), which captures political, economic, and financial risk in 2013 and is obtained from 
the International Country Risk Guide. The measure ranges from 1 to 6 and increases in 
protection of property rights. Second, Corruption Level is based on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index as of 2013, an index that measures corruption levels on a scale from 
1 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). 
Two direct measures of the benefits of saving taxes are the maximum tax brackets of 
Corporate Tax Rate and the Income Tax Rate in 2013, obtained from government agencies and 
audit firms. Tax Evasion is obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report conducted by the 
World Economic Forum. Countries’ tax evasion is rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree) to the statement “Tax evasion is minimal.” 
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3.4 Firm-level variables 
Here, we describe key dependent variables that capture firm value. We postpone a description 
of other variables to a later stage. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988), we use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. Tobin’s Q is obtained from Osiris as 
(Enterprise Value+Total Liabilities)/(Total Shareholder Equity (Book Value) + Total Liabilities) 
though all results are robust to similar definitions of Tobin’s Q. In additional tests, we construct 
cumulative abnormal returns around the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements using 
a 1-factor CAPM estimated for a rolling estimation period starting 292 days before and ending 
40 days before event days. We use respective local market indeces as a benchmark. All firm-
level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile, though results are robust to other 
specifications.  
4. Country- and firm-level correlations 
We now link the use of tax havens to country- and firm-level characteristics.  
4.1 Country characteristics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics by country. Countries are sorted by percentage of 
publicly listed firms that have at least one subsidiary headquartered in a tax haven as defined by 
the OECD Grey List (List 1). 
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
Table 2 reveals that besides Singapore—where 100% of sample firms are classified as tax 
haven firms (because Singapore is classified a tax haven by the OECD Grey List)—the use of tax 
haven subsidiaries by public traded firms is most frequent in Switzerland, Norway, Malaysia, 
and the Netherlands: More than one in five firms headquartered in these countries have at least 
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one tax haven subsidiary. Some countries do not have any firm with tax haven subsidiary, most 
notably Argentina, Greece, and Russia. Notice, however, that one in six Greek firms make use of 
tax haven subsidiaries by Lists 2 and 3. 11.4% of US firms use tax haven subsidiaries; few 
Chinese firms (1.2%) use tax haven subsidiaries though this figure increases to 12.1% when 
using List 4, which includes Hong Kong and Macau. The average country has between 7.2% and 
20.3% tax haven firms (by the TIEA List and List 4, respectively).  
Figure 2 illustrates correlations between the use of tax haven subsidiaries at the country level 
and country-level variables. The y-axis denotes the percentage of publicly listed firms that have 
at least one tax haven subsidiary using the OECD Grey List as of August 17, 2009. Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Ireland are omitted because these jurisdictions constitute tax havens by at least 
one of the tax haven definitions. The x-axis denotes country-level characteristics. 
--- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
We show that the use of tax haven subsidiaries is more prevalent in countries with stronger 
property rights protection and lower corruption levels. While not causal, it is costlier to divert 
resources from shareholders in countries with strong property right protection and little 
corruption. The opaque nature of tax haven subsidiaries facilitates stealing when stealing is 
costly at home. Moreover, when corruption is prevalent and shareholder protection is absent, 
managers do not need a tax haven to divert resources from shareholders (see evidence from 
Russia in Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007 or Mironov 2013).  
In Online Appendix 3, we extend this analysis to tax rates, tax evasion, and economic 
development. Indeed, the use of tax havens is more common in countries with higher tax rates. 
This result indicates that tax haven subsidiaries may have a higher marginal benefit in high tax 
environments, as suggested by our model. We also find that tax haven subsidiaries are used more 
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in countries with low tax evasion scores. Again, where avoiding taxes directly in the home 
country is easy, a tax haven subsidiary is of less use.  
Moreover, we find in Online Appendix 3 that the use of tax havens is more prevalent in 
countries that are economically more advanced as measured by the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita. Thus, our simple correlations with country variables may be flawed by not controlling for 
economic development. We address this concern in Online Appendix 4 by running a probit  
regression where the dependent variable is the percentage of firms that use tax haven 
subsidiaries. In addition to the country characteristics discussed above, we control for economic 
development. We find that the use of tax havens correlates with protection of property rights, 
low corruption levels, tax rates, and low tax evasion after controlling for economic development. 
Moreover, protection of property rights and low corruption levels are robust to additionally 
controlling for overall taxes. A related concern is that our correlations are driven by outliers—
such as countries with few observations in our dataset. Panel B of Online Appendix 4 confirms 
our results, weighing observations by the number of sample firms.  
Overall, Figure 2, supported by Online Appendices 3 and 4, provides our first indicative 
evidence for underlying motives for the use of tax haven subsidiaries. The correlations  support 
the notion that tax haven activities serve a goal that is aligned with the private interests of 
controlling owners beyond the pure tax-saving motive. More broadly, these results align with the 
notion that country characteristics determine firm characteristics. 
4.2 Firm characteristics 
Before we focus on establishing a causal link between the use of tax havens and firm value, 
we introduce firm-level data. Firm-level summary statistics are presented in Table 3. While our 
source of subsidiary data comprises 17,331, we restrict the sample to those 10,513 publicly listed 
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firms for which we can construct Tobin’s Q.21 All accounting measures are constructed at the 
firm-year level and then summarized by firm over the 2004–2013 period to obtain one 
observation per firm.22 Panel A shows summary statistics for each variable and splits firms into 
firms with and without tax haven subsidiaries. While we use the definition of the OECD Grey 
List, our results are robust to using any other list. Panel B focuses on the subset of firms with at 
least one foreign subsidiary.  
--- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
Roughly one in six sample firms (17.2%) have at least one tax haven subsidiary. Firms with 
tax haven subsidiaries tend to be larger, older, and grow more slowly, but are more profitable 
(measured by profit margin and ROA). Overall, they have a lower Tobin’s Q.  
Moreover, tax haven firms are 2.3% points more levered. The marginal benefit of saving taxes 
through tax haven subsidiaries may be larger for highly levered firms, given that additional 
leverage may come with substantial additional expected costs of distress.23 Firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries also face higher effective tax rates: Again, this finding most likely does not mean 
that tax haven subsidiaries increase effective tax rate; rather, it could indicate that some firms are 
unable to reduce taxes at home, increasing the benefits from using tax haven subsidiaries. Firms 
with tax haven subsidiaries hold less cash, though this result is turned around in the multivariate 
setting. Moreover, tax haven firms pay higher dividends, which, however, could be correlated 
with size, age, and leverage.  
                                                          
21
 This reduction in sample size is due to limited availability of accounting data for international firms. Specifically, while the 
market value of assets is by-and-large available, international accounting data lacks coverage of the book value of equity and 
liabilities. 
22
 Our univariate split and multivariate results are robust to using 2013 data (where sales growth is constructed from 2012–2013 
data). 
23
 At first sight, this result may appear at odds with Graham and Tucker (2006) who, after matching their sample of 44 firms, 
document that tax sheltering is associated with a decrease in leverage. However, we remark that Table 3 merely provides a 
univariate split of all sample firms without matching by firm characteristics. 
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In line with the idea that it is easier to transfer revenues through intangible assets such as 
patents registered in low tax countries, tax haven firms are firms with a higher fraction of 
intangible assets, patents, and trademarks, and are more likely to have trademarks or patents.  
Panel B repeats the previous analysis on firms with at least one foreign subsidiary and 
confirms most of the univariate results above. Additionally, Panel B introduces a measure of the 
cost of repatriating foreign revenue. Many jurisdictions (such as the US) impose repatriation 
taxes on revenues shifted from abroad to the home country; such repatriation taxes typically 
increase in the difference between (low) taxes paid abroad and (high) taxes paid at home. We 
document that tax haven firms are firms that face lower average taxes abroad than non-tax haven 
firms; also, their average foreign taxes are significant lower than their home taxes.  
In order to more formally study characteristics of firms that use tax haven subsidiaries, we 
employ firm-level probit regressions with industry and country fixed effects and control for 
various firm characteristics in Online Appendix 3. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven on the OECD Grey List.  
Controlling for a range of characteristics at once, the results for size, leverage, and being a 
dividend payer are statistically significant, while having more cash over assets becomes 
positively associated with having a tax haven subsidiary. Adding the difference between taxes 
paid abroad and taxes paid at home as an additional control provides further evidence for the 
repatriation argument discussed above. Panel B further investigates whether the transferability of 
assets, measured by intangible assets, R&D, and the use of patents and trademarks, explains the 
use of tax havens. Indeed, after controlling for all of the factors outlined in Panel A, firms with 
assets that allow for easier transfer of revenues are more likely to have tax haven subsidiaries. 
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Panels C and D of Online Appendix 3 further split our sample into US and non-US firms: all 
previous results are by and large confirmed.  
Overall, this sub-section provides correlations between firm characteristics and the use of tax 
haven subsidiaries. While these correlations confirm the tax-savings motive, this analysis also 
highlights that tax haven firms are different, suggesting the importance of matching by firm 
characteristics in later analysis.  
5. Evidence from Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
In this section, we exploit the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) to 
test if entrenched owners’ self-serving motives partially explain corporations’ use of tax havens.  
5.1 The impact of TIEAs on firm value 
In Panel A of Table 4, we study the effect of TIEAs on firm value using OLS regressions for a 
panel of firms from 1996 to 2013 following Equation (1). Column (1) uses the full sample of 
firms. In columns (2) and (3), one non-treated (control) firm is matched to each treated firm five 
years prior to the year a TIEA is signed. In columns (4) and (5), 10 firms are matched to treated 
firms. Firms are matched by country, industry, log of assets, and log of age with replacement.  
--- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
We find that the passage of TIEAs does indeed lead to an increase in firm value. In the full 
sample, Tobin’s Q increases by 2.5% after treatment. The effect is still significant and similar in 
magnitude for samples of 1 control firm (2.6%) and 10 control firms (2.3%). In Column (1), the 
counterfactual constitutes all non-treated firms as well as treated firms prior to the passage of a 
TIEA. In columns (2) and (4), treated firms before the passage and control firms from the same 
headquarter country both before and after the passage of TIEAs act as control group. In Columns 
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(3) and (5), we add a dummy for non-treated firms after the TIEA. This measure allows us to rule 
out headquarter country-specific shocks that correlate with the passage of TIEAs—such as 
changes in tax enforcement—as explaining our results. The coefficient on control firms after the 
passage of TIEAs is very close to zero and statistically insignificant, suggesting that no such 
shocks are at play. We conclude that TIEAs only affect treated firms and that this result is not 
driven by country-specific characteristics.  
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by specific countries, we remove countries 
individually from our analysis; our results are robust. Scandinavian countries were particularly 
prone to sign TIEAs but our results hold for the subset of Scandinavian countries and non-
Scandinavian countries, respectively. Moreover, all results are robust to removing financial firms 
and to using alternative lists of tax haven territories to define tax haven firms. Our results on 
entrenchment are also robust to removing each event year individually from our analysis.  
Of course, one immediate concern is that the parallel trend assumption is violated: Firms with 
subsidiaries in treated havens may become more valuable year after year regardless of the 
passage of TIEAs. We therefore analyze firm value year by year around the passage of TIEAs in 
Figure 3. The x-axis denotes years around the passage of TIEAs. The y-axis shows the 
coefficient from an interaction between year-to-event dummies and a treatment indicator 
variable. The increase in firm value occurs abruptly between year -1 and year +1 around the 
treatment date, alleviating the concern that the parallel trend assumption is violated. 
--- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
To further alleviate the concern of time trends, we study daily abnormal returns around the 
signing of TIEAs. Such event study using daily data also reduces the concern that an annual 
measure such as Tobin’s Q captures some policy changes that occur on an annual basis, as well 
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as the concern that Tobin’s Q may increase mechanically due to change in accounting practices 
associated with the passage of TIEAs. While it is impossible to nail down precisely the first 
announcement of most TIEAs by the press, anecdotal evidence suggests that TIEAs are not 
discussed in public long before they are signed. Indeed, for a randomly selected sample of 10 
TIEAs that we search in FACTIVA,  we find that These agreements are mentioned no more than 
five days before or after the signature date. Figure 4 shows cumulative returns around the 
passage of TIEAs and re-confirms the positive effect on affected firms’ value, alleviating 
concerns about Tobin’s Q. 
--- FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
Figure 4 documents an increase in firm value of 4-5%. However, this magnitude has to be 
interpreted with caution. First, raw returns also reflect risk (indeed, tax haven firms tend to have 
a higher beta). Second, TIEAs may have been signed during bull markets on average. In order to 
control for risk and general market movement, we study daily returns and abnormal returns in a 
multivariate framework (Table 4, Panel B). We study a range of event windows around the 
signature date to account for the fact that TIEAs may be announced shortly before or after the 
signature day. We confirm our previous results: Firms affected by TIEAs have positive daily 
returns around the signature date, also after controlling for market risk. The magnitude of the 
effect is slightly lower than that for Tobin’s Q regressions once we control for market risk and 
focus on the days around passage; however, it should be noted that we may underestimate the 
true effect somewhat as some TIEAs may have been announced outside of those event windows 
tht we estimate. The event study methodology employed here follows Schipper and Thompson 
(1983), but our results are robust to running seemingly unrelated regressions to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns on portfolios with treated and non-treated firms (e.g., Karpoff and 
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Malatesta 1995). Our results are also robust when restricting the sample to treated and control 
firms on days around the signing of TIEAs.  
Our estimate of the effect of TIEAs on firm value is likely conservative. First, some control 
firms may be indirectly affected by TIEAs through third party transactions with tax havens. As 
discussed in the data section, we only observe subsidiaries held to 50% or more but no third 
party transactions. Second, and relevant for any event study, as more and more TIEAs are 
signed, shareholders may revise upwards their beliefs about the introduction of future TIEAs. 
Third, as we will show below, some treated firms actively avoid TIEAs. The treatment effect is 
higher for firms that do not avoid TIEAs through haven hopping.  
In sum, we show in this subsection that a positive shock to the transparency of tax haven 
activities increases shareholder value of firms with subsidiaries in affected tax havens. This 
evidence is consistent with the notion that entrenched owners use tax havens for self serving 
activities beyond pure tax saving as outligned in our theoretical model in the Appendix. 
5.2 Channels 
In this subsection, we investigate channels through which TIEAs affect shareholder value. 
Specifically, we study whether TIEAs have a larger effect on firms with larger exposure to tax 
havens, whether firms actively avoid TIEAs by shifting operations to other tax havens, and 
whether TIEAs lead to operational gains.  
5.2.1 Complexity of firms’ structure within tax havens  
We begin by studying whether the impact of TIEAs on firm value interacts with the 
complexity of firms’ tax haven operations. Potential predictions are discussed in the Section 2 
and formally derived in the Appendix. The model shows that complexity enhance the effects of 
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TIEA on shareholder value for both the tax saving and the entrenchment effect; however, the tax 
motive predicts a negative interaction effect whereas the entrenchment motive predicts a positive 
interaction effect. 
In Panel A of Table 5, we start by documenting that firms with subsidiaries in tax havens are 
more complex than firms without tax haven subsidiaries on average. We provide a range of 
measures of complexity, including the number of subsidiaries and the number of hierarchical 
levels. Indeed, firms with at least one tax haven subsidiary have significantly more subsidiaries 
and have a significantly more complex subsidiary structure measured by the number of 
hierarchical levels; as shown in multivariate regressions in Panel B, this still holds after 
controlling for country and industry fixed effects and various firm characteristics including size. 
--- Table 5 ABOUT HERE --- 
In Panel C, we link the complexity of firms’ tax haven operations to the magnitude of the 
treatment effect. A complex structure within a given tax haven should make it harder for 
minority investors and outsiders to monitor and control the actions pursued by insiders. We test 
this idea using two measures of firms’ complexity within tax havens, the logarithm of the 
number of subsidiaries in tax havens (Columns (1)-(5)) and the fraction of a firm’s subsidiaries 
that are headquartered in tax havens (Columns (6)-(10)). Interacting treatment with complexity, 
we find that TIEAs have a significantly more positive effect on firms with complex tax haven 
structures. We repeat this analysis for matched samples and re-confirm this result. The 
interaction term is significant at 1 percent level and robust across different specifications.  
In sum, TIEAs have a significantly larger positive shareholder effect on firms with complex 
tax haven structures. This finding provides further support for that entrenched owners use tax 
havens for self serving activities beyond pure tax saving. Indeed, if tax havens were only used to 
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save corporate taxes, our model would suggest a larger negative effect of TIEAs on firms with 
complex tax haven structures, the exact opposite of our findings. 
5.2.2 Haven hopping 
One alternative response to TIEAs is to engage in haven hopping: Managers might 
strategically close tax haven subsidiaries in treated tax havens and open new tax haven 
subsidiaries in unaffected tax havens.  
We investigate this possibility in Table 6. Panel A follows firms through the first wave of 
TIEAs from 1998 to 2008 and the second wave from 2008 to 2013, respectively. At the 
beginning of each sample period, we categorize firms as (i) having no tax haven subsidiary, (ii) 
having a tax haven subsidiary in at least one tax haven that subsequently signs a TIEA, and (iii) 
having tax haven subsidiaries but exclusively in tax havens that never sign TIEAs. We then 
establish whether firms change categories over the sample period.  
--- Table 6 ABOUT HERE --- 
Most importantly, one third of firms that have a subsidiary in a subsequently affected haven at 
the beginning of the sample period close that subsidiary and move exclusively to non-affected 
tax havens (33% from 1998 to 2008, and 31% from 2008 to 2013). At the same time, only 10% 
and 7% of firms with tax haven subsidiaries move into affected tax havens from 1998 to 2008 
and from 2008 to 2013, respectively. Moreover, most firms that do not have tax haven 
subsidiaries at the beginning of our sample period do not move into tax havens; however, among 
those firms that do open such subsidiaries, most open them in unaffected tax havens. 
If such strategic haven hopping was sought by managers to continue self-serving activities 
and if shareholders predicted the continuation of such activities, the value of firms engaged in 
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haven hopping should respond less positively to the passage of TIEAs. It is difficult to obtain 
announcement dates of firms’ decisions to engage in havens hopping. Nevertheless, in Panel B, 
we investigate whether the change in treated firms’ value is partly explained by haven hopping. 
We follow our main specification (Table 4) but additionally interact treated firms with a dummy 
that equals one if a firm subsequently engages in haven hopping. While statistically just around 
the 10% level, we find that treated firms that engage in haven hopping are less positively 
affected by the passage of TIEAs than are firms that do not engage in haven hopping. Thus, the 
positive impact of TIEAs on average shareholder value is driven by companies that do not 
engage in haven hopping. 
In sum, we show that some managers react to TIEAs by moving subsidiaries to other non-
treated tax havens and that doing so is against the interests of shareholders. Taken together, this 
finding constitutes strong evidence that some firms strategically avoid tax havens that signed 
TIEAs. The fact that such strategic moves are not associated with an increase in firm value 
provide further evidence for that tax havens are used by entrenched owners for self serving 
activities. 
5.2.3 Operations 
We now investigate whether operational explanations exist for our main result that TIEAs 
have a positive effect on shareholder value. For instance, one could think that TIEAs improve 
monitoring, which in turn reduces managerial slack. Table 7 follows the methodology outlined in 
Equation (1) but tests for the effect of TIEAs on profit margin and gross margin. Moreover, we 
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test for further drivers of Tobin’s Q: specifically, we analyze the effective tax rate and risk 
(measured by beta), as well as leverage.24  
--- Table 7 ABOUT HERE --- 
Overall, our results indicate that treated firms do not increase their profit margin or gross 
margin. While the gross margin does go up (at 10% significance level), this result does not hold 
when matching treated firms to control firms.  
TIEAs might have an indirect impact on effective tax rates either because firms reduce 
activity in the grey area between legal and illegal tax avoidance or because home country tax 
authorities use TIEAs to adjust the home country tax base; however, both these channels would 
predict a decrease in Tobin’s Q. Our analysis suggests that effective tax rates are unaffected by 
TIEAs.  
Part of the increase in firm value may stem from a reduction in investors’ uncertainty. While 
the discount rate applied by investors is hard to measure, one of its components is firms’ 
exposure to the market. We find no significant effect of TIEAs on firms’ beta.  
Finally, if tax haven operations were a substitute tax-savings mechanism for leverage, firms 
might respond to TIEAs by levering up. We do not observe an increase in leverage after the 
passage of TIEAs.  
This subsection provides evidence that the increase in firm value associated with the passage 
of TIEAs is not driven by operational efficiency gains or reductions in uncertainty on their own.  
5.3 Cross-sectional results 
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 Our test of drivers of the result on Tobin’s Q will be incomplete as some drivers of Tobin’s Q are harder to observe. For 
instance, with a model where firm value is determined by a growing annuity in mind, Tobin’s Q is also affected by survival 
(reflected in the number of annuity payments).  
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Having established that the use of tax haven subsidiaries is at least partly driven by self-
serving activities, we now turn our attention to characteristics of firms that benefit more from the 
passage of TIEAs. In Table 8, we re-run our main specification and interact treatment with a 
range of cross-sectional firm characteristics. 
--- Table 8 ABOUT HERE --- 
First, some firms are less monitored prior to the passage of TIEAs; outside shareholders of 
such firms may benefit even more from additional monitoring imposed by the passage of TIEAs. 
Indeed, we document that our result is driven by firms with lower institutional ownership (Panel 
A; Institutional Ownership is obtained from Capital IQ). This finding is in line with the notion 
that institutional investors, to some extent, act as monitors. Confirming this, we also find that 
firms that are less levered and more fast-growing (measured by cash flow growth) are more 
positively affected by the passage of TIEAs. This result accords with the view of leverage as a 
monitoring device and with anecdotal evidence that internal control systems do not catch up in 
fast-growing firms. 
Second, we focus on intangible assets in Panel B. We established above that firms with 
intangible assets are more likely to use tax haven subsidiaries. Arguably, these firms benefit from 
the fact that they do not have to shift physical assets to tax havens in order to claim lower tax 
rates. Of course, while these firms may find it less costly to save taxes by shifting revenues, the 
unobservable nature of assets being shifted also makes such activities less transparent. The 
passage of TIEAs does not challenge tax savings; however, it challenges potential entrenchment 
involved in shifting revenues from intangible assets into tax havens. Indeed, we document that 
firms with patents and trademarks—measured by numbers and indicator variables—are more 
positively affected by the passage of TIEAs. 
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6. Causal relationship between home-country corporate tax rates and firm value 
Our focus so far has been on providing evidence for that tax havens are used for entrenchment 
purposes that go beyond minimizing corporate taxes. It is important to emphasize that saving 
taxes still is the key motive for establishing tax haven subsidiaries. We have already documented 
that the use of tax havens correlates with country-level tax rates and that firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries are firms that face relatively low taxes abroad, i.e., that face relatively high 
repatriation taxes. We now seek to provide causal evidence on the tax savings motive. We 
exploit the fact that some countries reduced their maximum corporate tax bracket over the period 
2008–2013. 
Illustratively, Figure 5 plots changes in corporate tax rates between 2008 and 2013 against 
changes in firm value and changes in the use of tax haven subsidiaries, respectively. Changes in 
the corporate tax rate are obtained from KPMG’ Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2014; a 
negative value denotes a reduction in corporate tax rates over the five-year period. On the left, 
the y-axis denotes changes in the difference in Tobin’s Q from 2008 to 2013 for a balanced panel 
of roughly 4,000 firms that we could track over that time period.25  Specifically, firms are 
identified as tax haven firms in 2008. We then take the difference between Tobin’s Q of firms 
with tax haven subsidiaries in 2008 and firms without tax haven subsidiaries in 2008 and deduct 
it from the respective difference in Tobin’s Q in 2013. A negative value denotes that firms with a 
tax haven subsidiary have become relatively less valuable over the five-year period. In line with 
our prediction, we find that the difference in firm value between tax haven and non-tax haven 
firms becomes more negative in countries that reduce corporate tax rates more substantially: Tax 
reductions benefit firms but less so when firms use tax havens. 
                                                          
25
 We restrict our sample to countries in which we can track at least 5 firms with accounting data from 2008 to 2013.  
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--- Figure 5 ABOUT HERE --- 
In order to test this more formally at the firm level, Table 9 investigates the effect of changes 
in the corporate tax rate on firm value in a panel of publicly listed firms from 2008 to 2013. The 
left-hand side is Tobin’s Q. The key control variable is Change in Tax Rate, the cumulative 
percentage change in corporate tax rates over the previous years. Tax Haven Subsidiary is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven (as defined by 
the OECD Grey List). Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample, while Columns (3) and (4) use 
matched sample as before. All regressions follow equation (1) above. 
--- TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE --- 
Indeed, while a reduction in corporate tax rates leads to an increase in firm value, this result 
only holds for the subset of firms that do not have tax haven subsidiaries.26 In the matched 
sample, a 1 percentage point decrease in the corporate tax rate is associated with a 1.2% increase 
in value of firms without tax haven subsidiaries but no increase in the value of tax haven firms. 
An alternative reason why firms with tax haven subsidiary are less sensitive to changes in 
their home country tax rate is that they are likely more exposed to foreign tax rates. In a first 
robustness test, we repeat the analysis of Table 9 on the subset of multinational firms, i.e. firms 
with at least one foreign subsidiary. In a second robustness test, we additionally match by the 
foreign tax rate faced by multinational firms with and without tax haven subsidiary before home 
country tax rate changes occur. We confirm our results. 
When faced with a reduction in corporate tax rates, the marginal benefit of having a tax haven 
subsidiary may decrease. In the right panel of Figure 5, the y-axis denotes the difference between 
                                                          
26
 A negative Change in Tax Rate coefficient indicates that an increase in the tax rate leads to a reduction in firm value. Yet, 
knowing that the sample by and large contains tax reductions, we chose to interpret the coefficients in terms of tax reductions. All 
results are robust to removing countries that did not change their corporate tax rate.  
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the percentage of firms with tax haven subsidiaries in 2013 and the percentage of firms with tax 
haven subsidiaries in 2008. We focus on firms that we can track from 2008 to 2013 though we 
do not require that accounting data is available. A positive value means that the fraction of firms 
with tax haven subsidiaries has increased over the five-year period. In line with the idea that tax 
haven subsidiaries become more valuable when corporate tax rates are relatively higher, the 
percentage of firms with tax haven subsidiary increases less over the five-year sample period in 
countries that reduce corporate tax rates. 
In sum, this section tests the relationship between use of tax havens and impact of corporate 
tax reductions on shareholder value. In line with our model in the appendix and the notion that 
tax havens are used for tax saving purposes, we show causal evidence that the tax-saving motive 
is an important component in understanding why firms establish tax haven subsidiaries. 
7. Conclusion 
Tax haven subsidiaries can be used to reduce corporate taxes and to shield cash from outsiders 
such as minority shareholders. Consistent with entrenched owners’ self-serving motives, we 
document that the passage of TIEAs between countries and tax havens increases average 
shareholder value by 2.5%. While outright theft is hard to observe, this increase in firm value is 
unlikely to be driven by a reduction in managerial slack or by a reduction in uncertainty. 
Suggesting entrenchment, the documented positive effect of TIEAs on firm value is more 
pronounced in firms with strong exposure to tax havens and not present among firms that avoid 
TIEAs by engaging in haven hopping. Last but not least, firms that are more likely to suffer from 
agency problems, such as weakly governed firms, are more positively affected by the passage of 
TIEAs. In sum, we establish that investors endorse regulatory initiatives that have the potential 
of illuminating corporate activities in tax havens. At the same time, in keeping with the tax 
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motive, we find that a 1 percentage point reduction in home-country corporate tax rates is 
associated with a 1.2% increase in value of firms without tax haven subsidiaries, while firms 
with tax haven subsidiaries are unaffected. 
The amount of cash held offshore by multinational corporations has grown significantly over 
the past years, reaching tens of trillions of US dollars. Our paper provides new insights into 
drivers of corporate decisions to move activities to tax havens. We also provide relevant 
implications to policy makers. Specifically, the OECD’s emphasis on providing more 
transparency on offshore tax havens benefits shareholders. From shareholders’ perspectives, our 
results support plans to further extend the current set of TIEAs to incorporate as many countries 
and tax havens as possible.  
 
Appendix: A simple model 
In this section, we illustrate how tax saving and expropriation motives for establishing a tax haven 
structure interact. The model builds on earlier work by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Desai, Dyck and 
Zingales (2007), and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007). It provides a theoretical underpinning of the main 
empirical results of this paper. 
A.1 The tax motive  
We consider a firm headquartered in a non-tax haven called Home country. The firm has a revenue of 
1 and will have to pay a fraction t in taxes if this revenue stays in Home country. The firm has the 
opportunity to establish a tax haven structure at cost β. A tax haven subsidiary allows the firm to transfer 
a fraction φ = f(1+k) of the revenue to a tax haven where the tax rate is zero. φ is a function of two 
components: f is the fraction of cash flow that can be transferred to a standard tax haven structure (e.g. 
one subsidiary in a given tax haven) and k is the complexity of the firm structure within a given tax 
haven. We do not distinguish between legal and illegal transfers here: In principle, φ measures what is 
feasible to transfer given the current regulation and current level of monitoring by tax authorities. Thus, 
an increase in tax authorities’ oversight ability will reduce f. More complex structures may allow firms to 
transfer more cashflows to a tax haven. We also do not take a stand on why transferred funds increase in k 
though potential explanations include that more complex structures allow firms to legally transfer more 
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funds27 and that more complex structure make oversight more difficult, thereby providing incentives for 
firms to be more aggressive in tranfering funds to tax havens. For simplicity, we make the very strong 
assumptions that t, f, k and β are all exogenously given in the following.   
Let V be the security value of the firm. The owners of the firm will establish a tax haven structure if 
and only if 
∆	 ≡  − φ		 − 
	 + φ	 −  − 1 − 	 ≥ 0 
Or 
φ		 ≥  
A tax haven structure is established whenever the taxes saved are higher than the cost of establishing 
the subsidiary. Notice all owners will have the same interest even if they are entitled to different shares of 
the cash flow. We therefore get: 
Result 1:  Firms headquartered in countries with higher tax rates have greater incentive to establish a 
tax haven structure. 
Result 1 is illustrated in Online Appendix Table 1: We identify a clear positive correlation between tax 
rates and the use of tax havens.  
We now compare the impact of a change in tax rates on shareholder value for firms with and without 
tax haven subsidiaries. Assume that a change in corporate taxes does not change firms’ tax haven 
activity.28 Then we have: 
   Result 2: A decrease in corporate tax rate, t, will have a larger positive effect on the value of firms 
without tax haven subsidiaries than on the value of firms with tax haven subsidiaries. 
To save on notation, we prove the result by looking at the effect of an increase in tax rates. Let  
( ) be the value of the firm without (with) a tax haven structure: 
 	 ≡  − 
 
 	≡  − φ	 − 
	 + φ. 
                                                          
27
 The Irish sandwich, for instance, requires two subsidiaries outside the headquarter country. The Dutch sandwich adds a third 
foreign subsidiary in the Netherlands. 
28
 Allowing firms to withdraw from tax havens after a decrease in corporate taxes in home countries does not change Result 2: A 
marginal tax change will not impact the behavior for all firms which had a strictly positive gain from being in a tax haven before 
the change. Hence, a firm that decides to stop using a tax haven will have a smaller benefit from a tax reduction in the homeland 
than a firm that did not use tax havens prior to the tax reduction. 
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 Result 2 then follows from: 



≡ − < −1 + φ =



. 
Similarly, a decrease in corporate tax rates should have a larger (and positive) effect on measures of 
shareholder value for firms that do not have tax haven operations than for firms that do. In Section 6, we 
confirm this result by showing that a tax reduction has greater impact on firms without tax haven 
structures than on firms with tax haven structures.        
A.2 The expropriation motive  
We now add an expropriation motive for tax haven activities. Our aim is to analyze the combined 
impact of tax and expropriation motives on shareholder value. To do this, we introduce controlling and 
non-controlling owners into our simple model. By controlling owner, we mean an individual or a group 
of individuals that make central decisions in the firm, including the decision to set up tax haven activities. 
We assume that controlling owners include managers of the firm or that managers fully internalize the 
preferences of controlling owners.  
We extend the simple model above with the assumption that controlling owners are able to divert cash 
flows moved to the tax haven for their private use. This is a simplified way of modeling controlling 
owners’ self-serving activities. This simplifying assumption may cover a variety of activities such as 
tunneling of cash flows to third parties (including themselves), financing pet projects, or piling up cash 
that could have been paid out as dividend in stead. The ability of a controlling owner to engage in self-
serving activities creates a wedge between the interest of controlling owners and non-controlling owners 
who invest in the firm.  
We introduce the following notation. Let λ be the controlling owner’s cash flow stake. Notice λ can be 
close to zero, e.g. where the controlling owner is a professional manager. (1- λ) is thus the share of cash 
flows that goes to minority investors or non-controlling owners. As we are making empirical tests using 
Tobin’s Q and abnormal returns as shareholder value, we define shareholder value from the interest of 
investors without the private benefit that goes to controlling owners. 
We assume that the controlling owner diverts cash flow d in the tax haven at a cost of 

.  The 
marginal cost of diversion has two components. It is increasing in , which is determined by the quality of 
corporate governance in the tax haven, the legal protection of minority investors, and the ability of third 
parties such as auditors, institutional investors, or tax authorities in home country.  
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In addition, the cost of diversion is decreasing in k, which is the complexity of a firm’s tax haven 
activities. Minority investors and third parties have more difficulty monitoring the activities of controlling 
shareholders when the subsidiary structure is complex.  
The controlling owner’s value from investing in a firm that has tax haven operations,  !, is given by : 

 !
=λ[(1- φ )(1-t)] + λ (φ -d)+d- 

. 
The optimal level of diversion is d* = "#$	

. The controlling owner diverts less when the expected 
cost of diverting is higher and he internalizes a larger share of the cash flows. The controlling owner 
diverts more when tax haven activities are more complex. To save on notation, we assume that the cash 
flow transferred to the tax haven is always bigger than the optimal diversion, i.e., φ  > d*.  
Define the net rent to the controlling owner of the entrenchment activities as 
%&'
 !k,	, λ	 	≡ d*1 − λ	 − 

∗ ≥ 0 
which is non-negative by revealed preferences. 
The incentive for a minority owner to set up a tax haven structure is 
∆+, 	≡ 
+, −	-
+,
 =(1-λ)[(1- φ )(1-t)] + (1-λ) (φ - d*)-(1- λ)(1-t) ≥ 1 − λ	 
⇔ φt ≥ 	 ∗ +	. 
Minority shareholders want the firm to engage in tax haven activities if the amount saved in taxes is 
larger than the sum of the amount diverted by controlling owners and the cost of establishing a tax haven 
structure. 
The incentives for the controlling owner to set up a tax haven structure is given by 
∆ ! 	≡ 
 ! −	-
 !
 =λ(1- φ )(1-t) + λ φ +%&' !k,	, λ	 − λ(1-t) ≥ λ 
⇔ 	φt ≥ -%&'
 !k,	, λ	/ λ. 
The controlling owner engages in tax haven activities if the amount saved in taxes is larger than the 
cost of establishing a tax haven minus the net rent from entrenchment divided by the controlling owner’s 
share of cash flows. Notice that when the controlling owner internalizes a sufficiently small share of the 
cash flow, he always prefers establishing a tax haven structure even if it is not in the interest of the 
minority owners. Since %&' !k,	, λ	 is positive, we get:  
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Result 3: The controlling owner has larger incentives to engage in tax haven activities than the 
minority investors. 
Empirically, this result says that while both controlling and non-controlling owners may have an 
interest in setting up a taxhaven structure, controlling owners have a stronger incentive given their payoff 
from diverting common resources from minority owners. Thus, even if minority shareholders are in favor 
of a tax haven structure, they may also be in favor of sharper regulation of the use of taxhavens. One type 
of such regulation is embodied in Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). 
 TIEAs empower tax authorities in the Home country to receive better information about firms’ tax 
haven activities. In our simple world, a TIEA triggers two effects. The first is a reduction in f, the amount 
of cash transferred to a tax haven. As discussed in Section 2, a debate exists on whether TIEAs can or 
cannot affect firms’ tax bill. We therefore allow for the case where TIEAs may have no effect on f at all. 
The ability to receive more information about the financial flows of a firm’s tax haven operations may 
also generate additional information about the firm’s activities in the tax haven and to what extent these 
activities are aligned with the common interest for all shareholders. Through improved transparency, tax 
authorities, institutional investors, and other types of minority owners may receive better information 
about the firm’s engagement in a given tax haven including information about cash holding, ownership 
structures, investment in and business with third parties. Tax authorities are concerned about the legality 
of the transactions and financial flows. However, shareholders may fire managers, change their 
investment engagement, or raise public debates in the media based on evidence and suspicions that 
support the notion that managers are not maximizing shareholder value, even when these activities are 
perfectly legal. Thus the second effect of TIEAs is to increase the transparency of the tax haven activities 
and, by doing so, increase the cost of diversion, .  
Assume shareholder value is measured from the security value of the non-controlling owners. And 
define zero entrenchment activities as the situation where d* is zero before and after the TIEA. Finally, to 
save notation, we assume that a TIEA does not affect the incentives to have tax haven subsidiaries or not.   
Result 4: Assume that a TIEA is signed and it implies a reduction in f and an increase in γ. Then 
(a) TIEA has two opposing effects on shareholder value: 
1. The reduction in f decreases shareholder value. 
2. The increase in γ increases shareholder value. 
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(b) The negative impact from a change in f on shareholder value is decreasing in the complexity k of 
the taxhaven structure. 
(c) The positive impact on shareholder value of an increase in  γ increases in the complexity k of tax 
haven activities. 
Proof: 
Shareholder value is measured as the security value of the firm excluding the rent of entrenchment for 
the controlling owner. 

+, 	=   (1- λ )[(1- φ)(1-t) + (φ - d*) ]  
0	1					
1234
56
17
=(1- λ )t(1+k) which is positive. Thus a reduction in f reduces shareholder value. 
0	2					
1234
56
1
=- (1- λ)1'∗
1
 = 
'∗9

 which is positive. 
(b)        1234
56
171
=(1- λ )t. Thus the negative impact on shareholder value of f is decreasing in k.      
	(c) 								1234
56
11
=
"#:

	^2	which is positive. 
          q.e.d. 
Result 4 yields a number of testable implications. The first part tells us that if tax havens are only used 
for tax savings in the interest of all owners, then a TIEA should weakly reduce shareholder value. From 
this, it follows that if the impact of TIEAs on shareholder value is positive, controlling owners or 
managers must have self-serving interests behind using tax haven subsidiaries. We test this prediction in 
Section 5. 
 Parts (b) and (c) tell us that the effect of TIEAs is stronger for complex firms: First, the reduction in 
shareholder value from reduced ability to benefit from aggressive tax avoidance is more pronounced for 
complex firms. Second, the positive effect of improvements in external governance (such as through 
TIEAs) on value is more pronounced for firms with complex firm structures in tax havens. Our empirical 
analysis shows that the positive effect of TIEAs  on shareholder value is larger for more complex tax 
haven activities. This supports the notion of controlling owners engaging in self-serving activities beyond 
the interests of minority shareholders.   
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Table 1: Tax haven list 
This table lists countries and non-sovereign territories that are classified as tax havens by at least one of five sources: first, by the OECD Grey List 
(List 1; as of August 17, 2009); second, by the “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act” (List 2; S.1533; not enacted); third, by the original OECD Tax Haven 
List (List 3); fourth, by Hines and Rice (1994) (List 4); fifth, by entering a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA; OECD Harmful Tax 
Practices). Sovereign is a dummy variable equal to one if a tax haven is a sovereign country and zero otherwise. Population (in 000s) denotes the 
population in 2013 (World Factbook). Area (km2) denotes the land area in square kilometers (World Factbook). Pop Dens (ppl/km2) is population 
divided by area. #Foreign Subs is the number of subsidiaries headquartered in the respective territory in 2013 that are ultimately owned (>50%) 
by a foreign public or private parent firm (Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 2013/2014). Pop/ForSub and km2/ForSub denote population and 
area per foreign subsidiary, respectively.  
 
Country Name Region List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 TIEA Sovereign 
Pop 
(000s) 
Area 
(km2) 
Pop Dens 
(ppl/km2) 
#Foreign 
Subs 
Pop/ 
ForSub 
km2/ 
ForSub 
Andorra Europe 1 0 1 1 1 1 85 455 187 6 14,180 76 
Anguilla Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 0 13 91 148 20 673 5 
Antigua&Barb. Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 89 440 202 16 5,567 28 
Aruba Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 0 102 180 569 41 2,497 4 
Bahamas Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 319 9,992 32 219 1,457 46 
Bahrain MiddleEast 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,318 760 1,734 173 7,617 4 
Barbados Caribbean 0 1 1 1 1 1 283 430 659 182 1,556 2 
Belize CentralAm. 1 1 1 1 1 1 334 22,810 15 32 10,447 713 
Bermuda Pacific 0 1 1 1 1 0 65 50 1,296 844 77 0 
BritishVirginIsl. Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 0 28 153 182 1,486 19 0 
CaymanIslands Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 0 58 240 240 1,152 50 0 
ChannelIslands Europe 1 1 1 1 1 0 164 190 862 2 81,929 95 
CookIslands Pacific 1 1 1 1 1 0 14 240 59 20 708 12 
CostaRica CentralAm. 1 1 1 0 1 1 4,805 51,060 94 295 16,289 173 
Cyprus Europe 0 1 1 1 0 1 839 9,240 91 1,698 494 5 
Dominica Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 72 285 251 10 7,168 29 
Gibraltar Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1 30 7 4,412 354 85 0 
Grenada Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 105 340 310 18 5,860 19 
Guatemala CentralAm. 0 0 0 0 1 1 15,807 108,889 145 243 65,048 448 
HongKong EastAsia 0 1 1 1 0 1 6,131 1,042 5,884 12,387 495 0 
Ireland Europe 0 0 0 1 0 1 4,587 68,890 67 8,988 510 8 
IsleofMan Europe 0 1 1 1 1 0 84 570 148    
Jordan MiddleEast 1 0 0 1 0 1 6,318 88,780 71 106 59,604 838 
Lebanon MiddleEast 1 0 0 1 0 1 4,425 10,230 433 133 33,270 77 
Liberia WestAfrica 1 1 1 1 1 1 4,190 96,320 44 38 110,275 2,535 
Liechtenstein Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1 37 160 229 144 255 1 
Luxembourg Europe 0 0 0 1 0 1 531 2,590 205 5,154 103 1 
Macao EastAsia 0 0 0 1 1 0 608 28 21,696 205 2,963 0 
Maldives IndianOcean 1 0 1 1 0 1 338 300 1,128 20 16,922 15 
Malta Europe 0 1 1 1 0 1 419 320 1,311 585 717 1 
MarshallIsl. Pacific 1 0 1 1 1 1 53 180 292 13 4,043 14 
Mauritius IndianOcean 0 0 1 0 1 1 1,291 2,030 636 345 3,743 6 
Monaco Europe 1 0 1 1 1 1 38 2 18,790 183 205 0 
Montserrat Caribbean 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 102 51 5 1,033 20 
Nauru Pacific 1 1 1 0 0 1 9 21 449    
Niue Pacific 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 260 5    
Panama CentralAm. 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,802 74,340 51 611 6,223 122 
Samoa Pacific 1 1 1 1 1 1 189 2,830 67 231 818 12 
SanMarino Europe 0 0 1 1 1 1 31 60 521 7 4,464 9 
45 
 
Seychelles IndianOcean 0 0 1 1 1 1 88 460 192 17 5,194 27 
Singapore EastAsia 1 1 1 1 0 1 5,399 700 7,713 12,195 443 0 
St.Kitts&Nevis Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 305 999 305 14 21,769 71 
St.Lucia Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 181 610 297 35 5,168 17 
St.Vinc.&Gren. Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 1 109 389 281 9 12,153 43 
Tonga Pacific 1 0 1 0 0 1 105 720 146 4 26,235 180 
Turks&Caicos Caribbean 1 1 1 1 1 0 31 616 51 11 2,860 56 
USVirginIsl. Caribbean 0 0 1 1 0 0 105 343 307    
Uruguay SouthAm. 0 0 0 0 1 1 3,324 176,215 19 422 7,878 418 
Vanuatu Pacific 1 0 1 1 1 1 247 12,190 20 20 12,363 610 
              
Sovereign(mean/sum/median) 57% 70% 57% 84% 81%  1,790 20,145 1,278 44,907 5,567 19 
Non-Sovereign (mn/sum/med) 75% 67% 75% 92% 100%  106 234 2,134 8,013 671 2 
              
For Comparison              
USA NorthAm. 0 0 0 0 0 1 318,968 9,857,306 32 32,071 9,946 307 
     
 
 
 
      
 
 
  
46 
 
Table 2: Country-level summary statistics and the use of tax haven subsidiaries around the world 
This table provides country-level summary statistics. The sample consists of 52 countries for which at least one publicly listed firm with non-
missing size and industry affiliation in Datastream/Worldscope could be matched to Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 2013/2014. # Parent 
Firms denotes the number of publicly listed firms headquartered in the respective country. # Subsidiary Firms denotes the number of subsidiaries 
owned to 50% or more by the parent firms. List 1 through to List 4 and TIEA denote the % of parent firms that have at least one subsidiary in a tax 
haven where tax havens are countries or non-sovereign territories on respective lists (see Table 1 for definitions of lists); this percentage is 100% if 
the country is defined as a tax haven by the respective list. Log (GDP pc) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in USD in 2013 (Source: 
World Bank). Corporate Tax Rate is the maximum corporate tax bracket and Income Tax Rate is the maximum income tax bracket in 2013, 
obtained through various sources (largely government agencies and audit firms). Tax Evasion is obtained from the Global Competitiveness Report 
conducted by the World Economic Forum: Countries’ tax evasion is rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to the 
statement “Tax evasion is minimal.” ICRG (Property Rights Protection) captures political, economic, and financial risk in 2013 and is obtained 
from the International Country Risk Guide; the measure ranges from 1 to 6 and increases in protection. Corruption Level is based on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index as of 2013 (Source: Transparency International), an index that measures corruption levels on a scale 
from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). Countries are sorted by the % of public firms that have at least one subsidiary headquartered in a 
tax haven by List 1 (OECD Grey List, August 2009). 
 
Country 
 # Parent 
Firms  
#Subsidiary 
Firms  
% of Firms with Tax Haven Subsidiary  
(100% if country is TH by respective list) 
 Log 
(GDP pc)  
Corporate 
Tax Rate  
 Income 
Tax Rate  
 Tax 
Evasion  
 
ICRG  
Corruption 
Index  
    List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 TIEA       
              
Singapore 400 4,883 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 4.25% 11.27 19.0% 20.0% 5.05 3.00 9.20 
Switzerland 148 6,106 39.86% 45.95% 45.95% 50.00% 29.73% 10.90 25.0% 13.2% 4.49 7.00 9.00 
Norway 120 2,623 22.50% 25.00% 25.00% 26.67% 3.33% 11.07 28.0% 47.8% 3.96 7.00 7.90 
Malaysia 664 4,345 21.84% 24.85% 24.85% 24.85% 2.11% 10.05 25.0% 26.0% 4.34 4.00 5.10 
Netherlands 76 3,201 19.74% 30.26% 30.26% 36.84% 22.37% 10.75 25.0% 52.0% 3.40 7.00 8.90 
Japan 2,382 32,983 17.46% 25.90% 25.94% 26.15% 2.81% 10.51 38.0% 50.0% 4.41 7.00 7.30 
Chile 35 188 17.14% 20.00% 20.00% 14.29% 17.14% 10.02 20.0% 40.0% 4.20 6.00 6.90 
Portugal 18 724 16.67% 22.22% 22.22% 33.33% 27.78% 10.15 25.0% 54.0% 2.18 7.00 6.10 
France 367 12,482 16.35% 20.16% 21.25% 27.79% 17.71% 10.59 33.3% 45.0% 3.86 7.00 6.90 
Denmark 77 1,414 15.58% 20.78% 20.78% 25.97% 7.79% 10.67 25.0% 51.7% 3.70 7.00 9.30 
Finland 92 2,437 15.22% 21.74% 21.74% 27.17% 5.43% 10.60 20.0% 51.0% 3.53 7.00 9.00 
Austria 47 2,324 14.89% 23.40% 23.40% 27.66% 10.64% 10.70 25.0% 50.0% 3.60 7.00 8.10 
SaudiArabia 27 96 14.81% 14.81% 18.52% 14.81% 14.81% 10.85 20.0%   1.00 3.50 
Bangladesh 7 9 14.29% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 0.00% 8.06  25.0%  5.00 2.10 
Spain 93 3,038 13.98% 15.05% 17.20% 23.66% 15.05% 10.37 30.0% 52.0% 1.91 7.00 6.50 
UK 1,162 33,021 13.60% 18.59% 18.76% 26.33% 10.50% 10.50 24.0% 45.0% 4.67 7.00 7.70 
India 983 4,136 12.82% 15.46% 16.38% 15.97% 3.15% 8.60 30.0% 33.0% 2.16 4.00 3.40 
Germany 471 12,137 11.68% 15.50% 15.50% 18.26% 6.58% 10.68 29.8% 45.0% 3.41 7.00 7.90 
Philippines 87 773 11.49% 14.94% 14.94% 14.94% 10.34% 8.79 30.0% 32.0% 1.83 6.00 2.30 
USA 3,572 54,577 11.42% 15.37% 15.57% 18.03% 8.62% 10.88 39.0% 39.6% 4.47 7.00 7.30 
Venezuela 9 45 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 9.82 34.0% 34.0% 1.56 5.00 1.90 
Pakistan 18 30 11.11% 16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 5.56% 8.43 35.0% 35.0%  5.00 2.50 
Colombia 9 22 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 9.46 33.0% 33.0% 2.11 4.00 3.80 
HongKong 347 2,105 10.66% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 9.51% 10.88 16.5% 15.0%    
Belgium 77 1,536 10.39% 14.29% 14.29% 32.47% 25.97% 10.62 34.0% 55.0% 2.27 7.00 7.30 
Indonesia 124 528 9.68% 12.90% 12.90% 12.90% 0.81% 9.17 25.0% 30.0% 2.53 1.00 2.60 
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Australia 1,217 11,124 8.79% 10.85% 10.85% 11.67% 1.31% 10.72 30.0% 45.0% 4.58 7.00 8.70 
Italy 126 3,013 8.73% 11.11% 11.11% 26.19% 19.84% 10.44 31.4% 43.0% 1.77 7.00 4.80 
Mexico 12 319 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 16.67% 9.76 30.0% 30.0% 2.46 4.00 3.60 
Sweden 286 7,020 7.69% 14.34% 14.69% 16.08% 5.94% 10.68 22.0% 57.0% 3.39 7.00 9.30 
Korea 759 3,486 7.38% 14.23% 14.23% 14.76% 1.05% 10.43 22.0% 41.8%    
NewZealand 68 396 7.35% 8.82% 8.82% 8.82% 0.00% 10.42 28.0% 33.0% 5.00 7.00 9.30 
Thailand 260 1,141 7.31% 8.85% 8.85% 8.85% 0.38% 9.56 20.0% 35.0% 3.41 5.00 3.50 
Egypt 16 32 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 9.29 20.0% 20.0% 3.57 2.00 2.80 
Brazil 33 300 6.06% 6.06% 6.06% 12.12% 12.12% 9.62 34.0% 27.5% 2.14 6.00 3.50 
Ireland 37 786 5.41% 8.11% 8.11% 100.00% 8.11% 10.71 25.0% 41.0% 3.55 7.00 7.70 
Israel 205 1,464 5.37% 7.32% 7.32% 9.27% 3.41% 10.40 26.5% 52.0% 3.69 7.00 6.00 
Vietnam 21 48 4.76% 4.76% 4.76% 4.76% 0.00% 8.57 25.0% 35.0%  1.00 2.70 
Canada 776 3,980 4.12% 7.22% 7.22% 9.28% 4.90% 10.67 31.0% 50.0% 3.77 7.00 8.70 
SouthAfrica 256 2,252 3.13% 5.08% 5.47% 7.03% 2.34% 9.43 28.0% 40.0% 2.40 7.00 4.90 
Turkey 69 373 1.45% 1.45% 1.45% 2.90% 1.45% 9.85 20.0% 35.0% 2.07 3.00 4.60 
China 1,100 6,106 1.18% 12.00% 12.00% 12.09% 0.27% 9.38 25.0% 45.0%    
Poland 380 1,839 0.53% 0.79% 0.79% 1.84% 0.79% 10.06 19.0% 32.0% 2.19 7.00 4.60 
Argentina 23 105 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.02 35.0% 35.0% 2.41 6.00 2.90 
CzechRep. 14 63 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.22 19.0% 15.0% 2.54 7.00 5.20 
Greece 99 1,004 0.00% 16.16% 16.16% 19.19% 5.05% 10.13 33.0% 42.0% 2.36 7.00 4.70 
Hungary 15 215 0.00% 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 0.00% 10.05 19.0% 16.0% 1.97 7.00 5.10 
Kazakhstan 1 2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.04 17.5% 10.0%  2.00 2.20 
Nigeria 10 15 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.66 30.0% 24.0%  1.00 2.70 
Peru 1 3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.36 30.0% 30.0% 2.66 3.00 3.60 
Russia 103 900 0.00% 1.94% 1.94% 1.94% 0.00% 10.10 20.0% 13.0% 1.43 5.00 2.10 
Ukraine 32 101 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.07 25.0% 15.0%  2.00 2.50 
               
Sum /  
Country 
Mean 17,331 231,850 11.14% 16.25% 16.42% 20.26% 7.20% 10.04 26.55% 36.01% 3.12 5.43 5.47 
              
 
 
48 
 
Table 3: Firm-level summary statistics 
This table presents firm-level summary statistics and characteristics of firms with tax haven subsidiaries in 2013. Panels A and B report the number of sample firms, the mean, the 
mean if such firm has at least one tax haven subsidiary or no tax haven subsidiary (using the OECD Grey List to identify tax havens; see Table 1), and the difference in means with 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Panel A considers all firms, while Panel B focuses on firms with at least one foreign subsidiary. 
TH Subsidiary (Dummy) is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a tax haven subsidiary in 2013. TH Subsidiary w/Acc Info is constructed the same way but restricted to 
firms with non-missing total assets and non-missing data required to construct Tobin’s Q. All other accounting measures are restricted to firms for whom Tobin’s Q is available. 
Means of accounting variables are constructed from one observation per firm; firm-level observations are means over up to the last 10 years (2004–2013). Tobin’s Q is obtained 
from Osiris as (Total Equity+Total Liabilities)/(Total Shareholder Equity (Book Value) + Total Liabilities). Sales Growth is the average year-by-year growth in sales. ROA(%) is 
Profit & Loss before Tax / Total Assets in %. Cash Flows over Sales is Operating Cash Flow over Total Sales in %. Profit Margin and Gross Margin are Profit&Loss before Tax 
and Gross Profit over Operating Revenue, respectively. Effective Tax Rate is Income Taxes / Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization in %. Leverage is Total 
Liabilities and Debt / Total Assets. Dividend Payer Dummy is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm pays a non-zero dividend. Dividend Payout is the fraction of income paid out in 
dividends, assuming that firms with missing dividend information do not pay a dividend. Intangible Assets and R&D are intangible assets and R&D as a fraction of total assets. # 
Trademarks and # Patents denote the number of registered trademarks and patents in 2013. ID Trademark and ID Patent are dummy variables equal to one if a firm has a 
trademark and patent, respectively. ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets; Age is time between foundation and 2013. Mean Foreign Tax is the average maximum 
corporate tax rate faced by foreign subsidiaries weighing each subsidiary equally. Dif(Foreign-Home Tax) is the Mean Foreign Tax less the maximum tax rate at home. 
Accounting data and trademarks & patent data are obtained from Osiris and Orbis. Tax data is obtained from various sources including government agencies and KPMG. All 
accounting measures are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. The significance of the difference in means at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively 
 
 
               
 Panel A: All sample firms  Panel B: Firms with ≥1 foreign subsidiary 
          
    Does firm have TH Sub?     Does firm have TH Sub? 
               
Variable  #Firms Mean  yes no Difference  #Firms Mean  Yes No Difference  
                
TH Subsidiary (Dummy) 17,331 13.25%       7,578 40.25%      
TH Subsidiary w/Acc Info 10,513 17.23%       5,272 31.85%      
Tobin's Q 10,513 1.64  1.48 1.67 (0.18) ***  5,272 1.63  1.49 1.70 (0.21) *** 
Sales Growth 9,722 11.9%  8.7% 12.6% -3.9% ***  5,010 11.0%  8.8% 12.1% -3.3% *** 
ROA(%) 9,221 4.3%  5.3% 4.1% 1.2% ***  4,793 4.8%  5.4% 4.5% 0.9% *** 
Cash Flows over Sales 9,450 8.8%  10.7% 8.4% 2.4% ***  4,924 8.4%  10.8% 7.2% 3.6% *** 
Profit Margin 9,964 4.6%  6.6% 4.2% 2.4% ***  5,121 4.7%  6.6% 3.7% 2.9% *** 
Gross Margin 9,861 42.2%  41.8% 42.3% -0.6%   5,081 42.5%  41.9% 42.8% -0.9%  
Effective Tax Rate 8,051 21.4%  23.1% 21.0% 2.0% ***  4,045 23.3%  23.7% 23.1% 0.6%  
Leverage 9,940 47.3%  49.2% 46.9% 2.3% ***  5,079 48.5%  49.6% 48.0% 1.5% ** 
Cash over Total Assets 10,308 17.3%  15.7% 17.7% -1.9% ***  5,190 16.8%  15.3% 17.5% -2.2% *** 
Dividend Payer Dummy 10,513 49.8%  65.2% 46.6% 18.6% ***  5,272 55.5%  66.1% 50.5% 15.5% *** 
Dividend Payout 10,513 12.7%  15.0% 12.2% 2.9% ***  5,272 12.6%  14.4% 11.7% 2.7% *** 
Intangible Assets 9,889 10.9%  13.0% 10.5% 2.5% ***  5,038 13.8%  13.8% 13.8% 0.0%  
R&D 10,513 1.5%  1.7% 1.5% 0.3% **  5,272 2.1%  1.9% 2.2% -0.4% ** 
#Trademarks 10,513 7.0  14.2 5.5 8.7 ***  5,272 11.6  15.3 9.9 5.4 *** 
ID Trademark 10,513 39.9%  52.2% 37.3% 14.9% ***  5,272 56.4%  56.0% 56.6% -0.6%  
#Patents 10,513 64.7  170.4 42.7 127.7 ***  5,272 115.7  183.7 83.8 99.9 *** 
ID Patent 10,513 41.0%  49.9% 39.1% 10.8% ***  5,272 53.9%  53.5% 54.1% -0.6%  
ln(Assets) 10,513 11.9  13.1 11.7 1.4 ***  5,272 38.5  43.5 36.2 7.2 *** 
Age 10,513 33.6  41.6 32.0 9.7 ***  5,272 12.6  13.3 12.2 1.0 *** 
Mean Foreign Tax         5,206 26.5%  24.3% 27.5% -3.3% *** 
Dif (Foreign-Home Tax)         5,205 -4.8%  -6.4% -4.1% -2.4% *** 
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Table 4: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and firm value 
 
This table studies the effect of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) on firm value using OLS regressions. 
Panel A uses annual data from 1996-2013 and measures firm value by Tobin’s Q. Panel B uses daily data from 2003 to 
2013 and measures firm value by stock returns. Subsidiary data is obtained from Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 
2008/2009 and 1998/1999. In Panel A, the left-hand side variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q, calculated as 
before. The key control Treated after is an indicator variable equal to one in the years after a firm has been directly 
affected by a TIEA for the first time. A firm is directly affected (treated) if it is headquartered in a country that signs a 
TIEA and has a subsidiary in the other signatory country or non-sovereign territory (a tax haven). Column (1) uses the 
full sample of firms. In columns (2) and (3), one non-treated (control) firm is matched to each treated firm five years 
prior to the year a TIEA is signed. In columns (4) and (5), up to 10 firms are matched to treated firms. Control after is 
an indicator variable equal to one in the years after a firm is control firm to a firm affected by a TIEA for the first time. 
Firms are matched with replacement by country and industry and additionally by the natural logarithm of assets and 
the natural logarithm of their age, measured as the number of years since the founding year. All regressions control for 
the natural logarithm of assets, the natural logarithm of assets squared, firm fixed effects, and year times industry fixed 
effects. Treated=Control provides the p-value from testing that the coefficient on Treated after equals that on Control 
after. T-statistics for tests of significance of coefficients based on robust standard errors clustered at the country and 
year level (2-way clustering) are reported below coefficients. In Panel B, the dependent variable is firms’ raw return 
(Columns (1)–(4)), and alpha calculated using a 1-factor CAPM estimated for a rolling estimation period starting 292 
days before the respective day and ending 40 days before the respective day using the local market index as benchmark 
(Columns (5)–(8)). Treated is a dummy equal to one if a firm is directly affected by a TIEA for the first time (through 
being headquartered in one signatory country and having at least one subsidiary in the other signatory country) during 
respective treatment periods. A treatment period of [-t,t] denotes that a firm is treated within the next or has been 
treated within the previous t days because its headquarter country signs a TIEA with a relevant tax haven. All 
regressions include firm and day fixed effects. Dependent variables are multiplied by 100. Treated measures the 
average daily effect during the treatment period; Economic Effect documents the overall economic effect during the 
treatment period (=Treated coefficient * number of days in the treatment period). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. T-statistics for tests of significance of coefficients based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm and day level (2-way clustering) are reported below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Tobin’s Q 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ALL 1 Match 1 Match 10 Match 10 Matches 
 Ln(Tobin’s Q) Ln(Tobin’s Q) Ln(Tobin’s Q) Ln(Tobin’s Q) Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
      
Treated after 0.025*** 0.020** 0.026** 0.021** 0.023*** 
 
(3.22) (2.78) (2.68) (2.32) (2.87) 
      
Control after   -0.009  -0.005 
 
  (-0.77)  (-0.42) 
      
Ln(Assets) 0.098*** 0.045 0.047 0.127*** 0.128*** 
 
(3.82) (1.30) (1.33) (10.57) (10.53) 
      
Ln(Assets) Sqr -0.003*** -0.002* -0.002* -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(-4.12) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-9.81) (-9.89) 
      
Ln(Age) -0.103 0.020 0.019 -0.006 -0.007 
 
(-1.32) (0.31) (0.30) (-0.10) (-0.11) 
      
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 85141 4899 4899 14613 14613 
Adj. R2 0.712 0.769 0.769 0.745 0.745 
Treated=Control   0.091  0.071 
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Panel B: Daily stock returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Raw 
Return 
Raw 
Return 
Raw 
Return 
Raw 
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha 
Treatment 
period [-15;15] [-10;10] [-5;5] [-1;3] [-15;15] [-10;10] [-5;5] [-1;3] 
         
         
Treated 0.068*** 0.136*** 0.165** 0.187*** 0.067*** 0.138*** 0.171** 0.161*** 
 
(3.41) (3.43) (2.26) (3.01) (3.35) (2.68) (2.51) (3.95) 
         
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 20,522,997 20,522,997 20,522,997 20,522,997 20,106,275 20,106,275 20,106,275 20,106,275 
R2 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.007 0.011 0.011 
         
Economic 
Effect 2.11% 2.86% 1.82% 0.94% 2.08% 2.90% 1.88% 0.81% 
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Table 5: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and firm complexity  
This table investigates differences in firm structure between firms with and without tax haven subsidiary (Panels A and B) and tests whether firms 
with more complex haven operations are differentially affected by Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). Subsidiary data is obtained 
from Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 2013/2014 (Panels A–C) and supplemented by Who Owns Whom 2008/2009 and 1998/1999 (Panel C). 
In Panel A, the first measure of complexity is Number of Subsidiaries, the number of subsidiaries and subsidiaries of subsidiaries owned to 50% or 
more. >x Subsidiaries is a dummy equal to one if a firm has strictly more than x subsidiaries. Mean and Median depth indicate the mean and 
median hierarchical level at which to find a firm’s subsidiaries, respectively. ≥y Layers is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has at least y 
hierarchical layers. By that definition, a firm with at least one subsidiary that owns a subsidiary in turn is a firm with at least 2 layers, i.e., ≥2 
Layers=1. Panel A follows Table 3 (Panels A and B) in splitting the sample into firms with and firms without tax haven subsidiary. Panel B 
provides results of OLS and probit regressions where the dependent variable is one of the complexity measure and the key control is a dummy 
equal to one if a firm has a tax haven subsidiary and zero otherwise. Besides including industry and country fixed effects, firm-level controls 
outlined in Table 3 are included. Panel C repeats the main analysis (Table 4) but treatment is additionally interacted with the complexity of firms’ 
tax haven operations. Complexity of tax haven operations is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of tax haven subsidiaries (Columns 
1–5) and the percentage of a firm’s subsidiaries that are headquartered in tax havens (Columns 6–10). For matched subsamples, firms are matched 
with replacement by country and industry and additionally by the natural logarithm of assets and the natural logarithm of age, measured as the 
number of years since the founding year. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of assets, the natural logarithm of assets squared, firm 
fixed effects, and year times industry fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. T-statistics for tests of 
significance of coefficients based on robust standard errors clustered at the country and year level (2-way clustering) are reported below 
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Panel A: Firm-level summary statistics for complexity measures 
               
 All Sample Firms  Firms with ≥1 Foreign Subsidiary 
          
    Does firm have TH Sub?     Does firm have TH Sub? 
               
Variable  #Firms Mean  yes no Difference  #Firms Mean  Yes No Difference  
                
Number Subsidiaries 10,513 16.44  47.91 9.89 38.02 ***  5,272 27.3  51.2 16.2 35.0 *** 
>1 Subsidiary 10,513 78.4%  95.8% 74.8% 21.0% ***  5,272 90.9%  96.6% 88.2% 8.4% *** 
>3 Subsidiaries 10,513 56.5%  86.8% 50.2% 36.6% ***  5,272 75.9%  89.1% 69.7% 19.3% *** 
>5 Subsidiaries 10,513 44.0%  78.9% 36.8% 42.1% ***  5,272 64.6%  81.7% 56.5% 25.2% *** 
>10 Subsidiaries 10,513 28.9%  63.6% 21.7% 41.9% ***  5,272 46.7%  67.2% 37.1% 30.1% *** 
>20 Subsidiaries 10,513 17.0%  47.2% 10.7% 36.5% ***  5,272 29.8%  50.5% 20.1% 30.4% *** 
Mean Depth 10,513 1.31  1.72 1.23 0.49 ***  5,272 1.51  1.76 1.39 0.37 *** 
Median Depth 10,513 1.25  1.58 1.18 0.40 ***  5,272 1.41  1.62 1.31 0.30 *** 
≥2 Layers 10,513 44.3%  78.4% 37.2% 41.2% ***  5,272 65.2%  81.5% 57.6% 23.8% *** 
≥3 Layers 10,513 20.8%  49.2% 14.9% 34.3% ***  5,272 35.7%  52.4% 27.9% 24.6% *** 
≥4 Layers 10,513 10.9%  31.6% 6.6% 25.0% ***  5,272 19.9%  34.1% 13.3% 20.7% *** 
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Panel B: Complexity and the use of tax haven subsidiaries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Ln(#Subs) 
>1 Sub 
(Dummy) 
>3 Subs 
(Dummy) 
>5Subs 
(Dummy) 
>10Subs 
(Dummy) 
>20Subs 
(Dummy) 
Ln(Mean 
Depth) 
Ln(Median 
Depth) 
≥2Layers 
(Dummy) 
≥3Layers 
(Dummy) 
≥4Layers 
(Dummy) 
 OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit 
            
Tax Haven Firm  0.913*** 0.951*** 1.023*** 1.066*** 1.055*** 1.138*** 0.129*** 0.104*** 1.020*** 0.938*** 1.027*** 
  (Dummy) (24.42) (10.01) (14.26) (15.91) (16.69) (16.39) (14.72) (10.57) (15.28) (13.91) (13.37) 
            
Log (Assets) 0.240*** 0.173*** 0.271*** 0.315*** 0.351*** 0.412*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.276*** 0.329*** 0.336*** 
 (24.64) (11.66) (16.57) (16.64) (15.60) (16.28) (17.67) (14.48) (15.72) (16.24) (13.77) 
            
Return on Assets 0.219* 0.419* 0.596*** 0.813*** 0.311 0.271 0.058*** 0.062** 0.483** 0.240 0.221 
 (1.94) (1.75) (2.66) (3.37) (1.14) (0.76) (2.58) (2.49) (2.10) (0.85) (0.63) 
            
Eff. Tax Rate 0.189** 0.235 0.447*** 0.619*** 0.684*** 0.705*** 0.030* 0.023 0.561*** 0.743*** 0.711*** 
 (2.13) (1.30) (2.73) (3.72) (3.82) (3.28) (1.69) (1.17) (3.42) (3.81) (2.84) 
            
Leverage 0.320*** 0.266** 0.352*** 0.491*** 0.653*** 0.784*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.495*** 0.566*** 0.550*** 
 (5.99) (2.54) (3.56) (4.70) (5.52) (5.44) (6.77) (5.81) (4.76) (4.61) (3.54) 
            
Cash / Total Assets -0.459*** -0.345* -0.549*** -0.682*** -0.981*** -0.870*** -0.040** -0.045** -0.252 -0.736*** -0.466 
 (-5.03) (-1.89) (-3.22) (-3.75) (-4.56) (-3.13) (-2.21) (-2.23) (-1.37) (-3.11) (-1.51) 
            
Div Payer (Dummy) 0.203*** 0.242*** 0.265*** 0.278*** 0.355*** 0.333*** 0.003 -0.006 0.170*** 0.159** 0.178* 
 (5.72) (3.64) (4.34) (4.48) (5.28) (4.00) (0.50) (-0.80) (2.77) (2.16) (1.95) 
            
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Observations 5628 5534 5613 5613 5595 5571 5627 5627 5605 5598 5494 
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.544 0.189 0.266 0.325 0.380 0.457 0.401 0.288 0.300 0.392 0.433 
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Panel C: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and complexity of tax haven structure 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Complexity Measure: Log(Number Tax Haven Subsidiaries)  Complexity Measure: %Tax Haven Subsidiaries 
            
            
Sample ALL 1 Match 1 Match 10 Match 10 Matches  ALL 1 Match 1 Match 10 Match 10 Matches 
Dependent Var Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q  Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q Ln Tobin’s Q 
            
Treated after -0.009 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.011  -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 
 
(-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.80) (-0.86) (-0.59)  (-0.88) (-1.22) (-0.82) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
            
Treated after *  0.024** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.029***  0.690*** 0.784*** 0.860*** 0.713*** 0.908*** 
  Complexity (2.78) (3.11) (3.35) (3.32) (4.77)  (3.77) (4.43) (4.32) (3.95) (5.07) 
            
Control after   0.009  -0.007    -0.009  -0.006 
 
  (0.51)  (-1.10)    (-0.73)  (-0.99) 
            
Control after *    -0.007  -0.004    -0.074  -0.204* 
  Complexity   (-0.82)  (-0.52)    (-1.05)  (-2.09) 
            
Controls Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
            
N 65983 3578 3578 9790 9790  65971 3566 0.772 9778 0.747 
Adjusted R2 0.713 0.770 0.770 0.746 0.746  0.713 0.772 0.937 0.747 0.601 
Treated=Control   0.025  0.002    0.002  0.000 
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Table 6: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and haven hopping 
 
This table investigates whether firms moved their subsidiaries out of tax havens subsequent to tax havens entering Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs; Panel A) and whether doing so mitigates the effect of TIEAs on firm value 
(Panel B). Panel A is a conversion matrix tracking firms between (i) 1998 and 2008 and (ii) 2008 and 2013, 
respectively. Subsidiary data is obtained from Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 2013/2014, 2008/2009, and 
1998/1999. The sample is a balanced panel of firms with subsidiary data for 1998 and 2008, as well as 2008 and 2013, 
respectively. In part (i) of Panel A, each row gives the number of firms in 1998 and each column gives the number of 
firms in 2008. Shown are the number of firms without tax haven subsidiary, with tax haven subsidiaries in a tax haven 
that signed a TIEA between 1998 and 2008, with only tax haven subsidiary in tax havens that did not sign a TIEA 
between 1998 and 2008, and the number of sample firms. Numbers and percentages denote the number of firms and 
the percentage of the group moving from a category in 1998 to a category in 2008. For instance, out of 2,350 sample 
firms, 2,274 firms (97%) did not have a tax haven subsidiary in 1998, and 2,091 of these 2,274 firms (92%) did not 
have a tax haven subsidiary in 2008 either. Part (ii) of Panel A reports the same for firms in 2008 and 2013. Part (i) 
ignores firms affected by TIEAs after 2008; Part (ii) ignores firms affected by TIEAs prior to 2008. Panel B repeats 
our main analysis (Table 4), but treatment is additionally interacted with being a haven hopper. The left-hand-side 
variable is Tobin’s Q. The left-hand-side variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q, calculated as (Total 
Equity+Total Liabilities)/(Total Shareholder Equity (Book Value) + Total Liabilities). Treated after is an indicator 
variable equal to one in the years after a firm has been directly affected by a TIEA. A firm is directly affected (treated) 
if it is headquartered in a country that signs a TIEA and has a subsidiary in the other signatory country or non-
sovereign nation (a tax haven). Haven Hopper is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is treated by a TIEA and 
subsequently moves out of tax havens that entered TIEAs and into tax havens that did not enter TIEAs. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. T-statistics for tests of significance of coefficients based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the country and year level (2-way clustering) are reported below coefficients. 
 
Panel A: Haven hopping  
 
(i) Haven hopping between 1998 and 2008 
 
 2008 None  Affected TH Sub  Only Other TH Sub  Sum 1998  
1998                 
None 2,091  4  179  2,274 [97%] 
 
[92%]  [0%]  [8%]  
  
         
Affected TH Sub 0  10  5  15 [1%] 
 
[0%]  [67%]  [33%]  
  
         
Only Other TH Sub 0  6  55  61 [3%] 
 
[0%]  [10%]  [90%]  
 
 
         
Sum 2008 2,091  20  239  2,350  
 [89%]  [1%]  [10%]  [100%]  
 
(ii) Haven hopping between 2008 and 2013 
 
 2013 None  Affected TH Sub  Only Other TH Sub  Sum 2008  
2008                 
None 3,360  23  139  3,522 [90%] 
 
[95%]  [1%]  [4%]  
  
         
Affected TH Sub 0  83  37  120 [3%] 
 
[0%]  [69%]  [31%]  
  
         
Only Other TH Sub 0  18  251  269 [7%] 
 
[0%]  [7%]  [93%]  
  
         
Sum 2013 3,360  124  427  3,911 [100%] 
 [86%]  [3%]  [11%]  [100%]  
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Panel B: Haven hopping and firm value 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ALL 1 Match 1 Match 10 Match 10 Matches 
 
Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
Ln(Tobin’s 
Q) 
      
Treated after 0.026*** 0.021** 0.027* 0.022** 0.024*** 
 
(3.33) (2.24) (1.78) (2.46) (3.08) 
      
Treated after *  -0.015 -0.024* -0.022* -0.020* -0.019 
  Haven Hopper (-1.63) (-1.87) (-1.97) (-1.84) (-1.63) 
      
Control after   -0.008  -0.005 
 
  (-0.36)  (-0.41) 
      
Ln(Assets) 0.098*** -0.124 -0.124 0.127*** 0.128*** 
 
(3.82) (-1.22) (-1.22) (10.63) (10.58) 
      
Ln(Assets) Sqr -0.003*** 0.002 0.002 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(-4.12) (0.77) (0.77) (-9.85) (-9.92) 
      
Ln(Age) -0.103 0.027 0.026 -0.006 -0.007 
 
(-1.32) (0.46) (0.45) (-0.09) (-0.11) 
      
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y 
N 85141 4899 4899 14613 14613 
Adjusted R2 0.712 0.769 0.769 0.745 0.745 
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Table 7: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and determinants of firm value 
This table studies the effect of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) on various contributors to firm value using OLS regressions for a 
panel of firms from 1995 to 2013. The analysis follows exactly Table 6 but the left-hand side is Profit Margin (Profit&Loss before Tax / Operating 
Revenue in %), Gross Margin (Gross Profit / Operating Revenue in %), Effective Tax Rate (Income Taxes / Earnings before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation and Amortization in %), Beta (estimated in a 1-factor model of monthly excess stock returns on the headquarter country’s main 
market index’s excess return over 24 months), and Leverage (Total Liabilities and Debt / Total Assets). Odd-numbered columns report results for 
the whole sample; even-numbered columns report results for a sample of treated and control firms. Control firms are matched by country and 
industry and then additionally by the natural logarithm of assets and the natural logarithm of their age, measured as the number of years since the 
founding year. All regressions control for the natural logarithm of assets, the natural logarithm of assets squared, firm fixed effects, and year times 
industry fixed effects.  Treated=Control provides the p-value from testing that the coefficient on Treated after equals that on Control after. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. T-statistics for tests of significance of coefficients based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the country and year level (2-way clustering) are reported below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
 
Dependent Variable Profit Margin (%) Gross Margin (%) Effective Tax Rate Beta Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 
           
Treated after -0.827 -0.185 0.672* 0.767 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.042 0.002 -0.001 
 
(-1.41) (-0.37) (1.86) (0.92) (-0.41) (-0.04) (0.05) (-1.20) (0.08) (-0.18) 
           
Control after  -1.061  -0.346  0.004  0.003  0.005 
 
 (-1.68)  (-0.48)  (0.29)  (0.08)  (0.74) 
           
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ctr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 71810 4664 72119 4649 80226 4732 38940 2193 83512 4884 
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.464 0.843 0.883 0.309 0.357 0.339 0.379 0.678 0.788 
Treated=Control  0.411  0.474  0.809  0.506  0.615 
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Table 8: Tax Information Exchange Agreements and firm value: Cross-sectional results 
This table follows Table 4 in studying the effect of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) on firm value using OLS regressions. The left-
hand-side variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Set-up and controls follow Table 4, but the treatment dummy is additionally interacted 
with firm characteristics.  These interaction terms are generally continuous measures with the exception of institutional ownership dummies (equal 
to one if a firm has above-median institutional ownership by country and industry; Panel A Columns (1)-(2)), patent dummies (equal to one if a 
firm has at least one patent; Panel B Columns (3)–(4)), and trademark dummies (equal to one if a firm has at least one trademark; Panel B 
Columns (7)–(8)). Variable construction follows Table 3. 
 
Panel A: Ownership, leverage, growth, and Beta 
Interaction with… 
Institutional  
Ownership 
Dummy 
Leverage 
Continuous 
Cash Flow Growth 
Continuous Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 
         
Treated after 0.069*** 0.057** 0.243*** 0.241*** 0.031*** 0.030*** -0.036*** -0.032** 
 
(3.12) (2.96) (2.90) (3.74) (3.42) (3.18) (-3.23) (-2.61) 
         
Treated after * Interaction -0.053** -0.038* -0.364** -0.370*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 
 
(-2.42) (-1.81) (-2.42) (-3.35) (3.98) (5.55) (5.50) (3.55) 
         
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 38802 3574 83512 4884 69156 4316 45029 2502 
Adjusted R2 0.711 0.762 0.716 0.777 0.731 0.789 0.740 0.794 
 
Panel B: Patents and trademarks 
Interaction with… 
Ln(Patents)  
Continuous 
Patent 
Dummy 
Ln(Trademarks)  
Continuous 
Trademark 
Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 ALL Match 1 
         
Treated after -0.013 -0.017 -0.024 -0.016 0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.015 
 
(-0.54) (-0.76) (-1.20) (-0.79) (0.03) (-0.09) (-1.10) (-0.84) 
         
Treated after * Interaction 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.065*** 0.050** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.045*** 0.043** 
 
(2.85) (3.48) (2.90) (2.43) (2.29) (3.01) (2.87) (2.11) 
         
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year * Ind FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 82349 4786 82349 4786 82349 4786 82349 4786 
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.774 0.715 0.773 0.715 0.773 0.715 0.773 
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Table 9: Corporate tax rates and firm value 
This table investigates the effect of changes in the corporate tax rate on firm value in a panel of publicly listed firms 
from 2008 to 2013. The left-hand side is Tobin’s Q, obtained from Osiris as (Total Equity+Total Liabilities)/(Total 
Shareholder Equity (Book Value) + Total Liabilities). The key control variable is Change in Tax Rate, the cumulative 
percentage change in corporate taxes over the previous years, obtained from KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate 
Survey 2014. Tax Haven Subsidiary is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax 
haven (as defined by the OECD Grey List) using Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns Whom 2008/2009. Columns (1) and 
(2) use the full sample while Columns (3) and (4) use a sample of firms with tax haven subsidiary and control firms 
matched by industry, headquarter country, the natural logarithm of assets, and the natural logarithm of firms’ ages 
(measured by years since founding). All regressions control for the natural logarithm of assets, the natural logarithm of 
assets squared, firm fixed effects, and time fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels. T-statistics for tests of significance of coefficients based on robust standard errors clustered at the country and 
year level (2-way clustering) are reported below coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DV: Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
     
Sample: All All Matched Matched 
     
Change in Tax Rate -0.858 -0.872 -0.871** -1.217*** 
 
(-1.52) (-1.55) (-2.31) (-3.14) 
     
Change in Tax Rate   0.696*  1.027** 
  * Tax Haven Subsidiary  (1.79)  (2.68) 
     
Ln(Assets) 0.071** 0.071** 0.211*** 0.211*** 
 
(2.15) (2.15) (8.74) (8.68) 
     
Ln(Assets) sqr -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
(-3.11) (-3.12) (-5.23) (-5.22) 
     
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 37414 37414 5587 5587 
Adj. R2 0.813 0.813 0.851 0.851 
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Figure 1: Firms treated by Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) over time  
 
This figure shows the number of firms affected (treated) by Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
between two countries or non-sovereign nations over time. A firm is treated if it is headquartered in a country that 
signs a TIEA and has a subsidiary in the other signatory country (a tax haven). Some firms are affected by more 
than one TIEA: these are counted as treated the moment they are affected for the first time. Source: OECD 
Harmful Tax Practices and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: The use of tax haven subsidiaries and country characteristics 
This figure illustrates the use of tax haven subsidiaries at the country level. The y-axis denotes the percentage of 
publicly listed firms that have at least one tax haven subsidiary. Subsidiary data is collected from Dun & Bradstreet’s 
Who Owns Whom 2013/2014 book series. Tax havens are sovereign countries or non-sovereign nations that appear on 
the OECD Grey List (as of August 17, 2009); Hong Kong, Singapore and Ireland are omitted because they constitute 
tax havens by that list or other official tax haven lists. The x-axis denotes country-level characteristics. ICRG (Property 
Rights Protection) captures political, economic, and financial risk in 2013 and is obtained from the International 
Country Risk Guide; the measure ranges from 1 to 6 and increases in protection. Corruption Level is based on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index as of 2013 (Source: Transparency International), an index 
that measures corruption levels on a scale from 1 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). Each country observation is 
represented by an “X”; the line of best fit for equally weighted observations is shown. 
 
Panel A: Property rights protection    Panel B: Corruption level 
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Figure 3: Firm value around the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
 
This figure shows the evolution of firm value of treated firms relative to control firms around the passage of Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). The x-axis denotes years around the passage of TIEAs. The y-axis shows 
the interaction between year-to-event dummies and an indicator variable that equals one if a firm is directly affected by 
a TIEA. Interaction terms are obtained from an OLS regression on a sample of treated and control firms with the 
natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q on the left-hand side and controls for size and size squared as well as year and industry 
fixed effects on the right. Control firms are matched to treated firms 5 years before treatment by headquarter country 
and industry, as well as by the natural logarithm of assets and the natural logarithm of assets squared. 
 
 
          Year relative to Treatment (TIEA) 
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Figure 4: Daily returns of affected firms around the passage of Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
 
This figure plots cumulative returns of firms affected by Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) over the 100 
days surrounding the signing of a TIEA. A firm is directly affected (treated) if it is headquartered in a country that 
signs a TIEA and has a subsidiary in the other signatory country (a tax haven). Some firms are affected by more than 
one TIEA: they are counted as treated the moment they are affected for the first time. Event dates are spread over 10 
years (2002 to 2011). Returns are obtained from Datastream/Worldscope and cumulated; cumulative returns are 
standardized to equal zero a day before the signature date. 
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Figure 5: Value and use of tax haven subsidiaries around changes in corporate tax rates 
 
This figure plots changes in the corporate tax rate between 2008 and 2013 against changes in firm value and changes in 
the use of tax haven subsidiaries, respectively. Changes in the corporate tax rate are obtained from KPMG’ Corporate 
and indirect Tax Rate Survey 2014; a negative value denotes a reduction in corporate tax rates over the five-year 
period. On the left, the y-axis denotes changes in the difference in Tobin’s Q from 2008 to 2013. Specifically, the 
difference between Tobin’s Q of firms with tax haven subsidiaries in 2008 and firms without tax haven subsidiaries in 
2008 is deducted from the respective difference in 2013. A negative value denotes that firms with tax haven subsidiary 
have become relatively less valuable over the five-year period. Subsidiary data is collected from Dun & Bradstreet’s 
Who Owns Whom 2013/2014 book series. Tax havens are sovereign countries or non-sovereign nations that appear on 
the OECD Grey List (as of August 17, 2009). Tobin’s Q is obtained from Osiris as (Enterprise Value+Total 
Liabilities)/(Total Shareholder Equity (Book Value) + Total Liabilities). On the right, the y-axis denotes the difference 
between the percentage of firms with tax haven subsidiaries in 2013 and the percentage of firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries in 2008. A positive value means that the fraction of firms with tax haven subsidiaries has increased over 
the five-year period. Each country observation is represented by an “X”; the line of best fit for equally weighted 
observations is shown. 
 
 
 
